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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Impact of COVID-19 on Port Terminal Performance in
the United States of America: A Case Study of the Port of
Los Angeles, CA
Degree:

Master of Science – Maritime Affairs (Port Management)

With the emergence of the Coronavirus Disease (i.e., COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2) and
its ascension to global pandemic, created significant disruptions with catastrophic
impacts to global-trade, seafarer welfare, economies, travel, demand and supply,
supply chains and logistics. With uncertainty as to when the virus will abate, it has
become more critical than ever for Port Authorities, Marine Terminal Operators, and
Supply Chains to collaborate and utilize resiliency measures to reign in chaos. In this
study, we will focus on defining resilience, recognizing the sociological,
technological, and economical theories that contribute to disruption growth,
construct resiliency framework to counteract these changes, and measure the impacts
of Port Performance to the largest seaport in the United States, the Port of Los
Angeles. Utilizing key performance indicators (KPIs) from UNCTAD and IMO
Publications, we will draw an analysis, focusing on pinpointing supply chain
bottlenecks that were witnessed. Several of these findings include overcapacity of
vessels at anchor and berths, terminal volume capacity and throughput, truck and rail
statistics (e.g., turnaround, queue and dwell times), and warehousing (e.g., net
absorption of goods, percent vacancy and real-estate availability). To compliment
this statistical data, we will utilize various sources such as Google Scholar, Elsevier,
JSTOR, Academia, Port Authority databases, and a questionnaire, to support findings
to the research problems of how Port Terminal Performance has been impacted by
COVID-19, why it’s been considered as one of the worst disruptors of Global
Maritime Trade, and what strategies and decisions Port Executives can take to
mitigate future chaotic disruptions.

KEYWORDS: COVID-19 (SAR-CoV-2), Port Terminal Resilience, Port Terminal
Performance, Resilience, Global Disruption, Multi-Criteria Decision Making
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction
This chapter summarizes the origins and development of the Port of Los Angeles and
Containerization within the United States. Understanding their unique connections to
one another has led to innovation, development and standardization of Port Terminal
Systems along the southern coastline of California. These three characteristics, have
helped to demonstrate how events in time have forced change, and prioritized the
urgency for systems to become adaptive to defend from future chaos and disruptions.
System Innovation, Development, and Standardization can cohesively be seen as
positive and negative contributions to both the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach and
Supply Chain Resilience within the San Pedro Bay Port Complex. In Chapter 1, we
will define Disruption, what it means for Port Terminals and Supply Chain Systems,
and how disruptions have significantly impacted the Port of Los Angeles.
After successfully defining Port Terminal disruption, we will connect the case study
of the Port of Los Angeles, to answer the follow-on research questions throughout
the preceding Chapters.
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Chapter 1.1 The Foundations of “America’s Port”
On December 9th, 1907, strategically located south of the San Gabriel’s Mountains
in the State of California of the United States, the Port of Los Angeles was opened to
world commerce and bridged the link between states within the developing young
nation.

Figure 1: Port of Los Angeles Terminals (Source: Port of Los Angeles Official Website, 2021)

Prior to this grandeur achievement, the history of the Port of Los Angeles and
Southern California spans deeply to centuries prior, through several accounts from
settlers, including the Portuguese explorer Juan Rodriquez Cabrillo (Palmer, 2007).
As a seafarer and servant commissioned by the Spanish Government, he set sail to
discover the Gulf of Mexico and Western Coastline of the United States in the 16th
Century. Originally named Bahia de Los Fumas or “Bay of Smokes,” was due to the
initial Indian Settlement and continuous smoke of their villages seen from the distant
Pacific Ocean. When the 13 Colonies of the Eastern Seaboard seceded and declared
independence from British Rule in 1776, most of the territories continued to be
owned by other countries, including Spain and France. Trade, was greatly impacted
by this command and domineering proxy control. Through time, multiple treaties,
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purchase agreements, annexations, revolts and cessions would arise to change and
alter these territories, with the 1822 exodus of the Mexican Government as one key
component towards a free state of California. As a result, this led to surges of
settlement and commercial trade and the formation of the 50 now known states
within the United States. Following flourishing business, influenced many important
delegates, entrepreneurs and businessmen to establish San Pedro Bay as a gateway
for West Coast Trade. The most important of these tradesmen, Phineas Banning,
would be responsible for founding the county of Wilmington from which the Los
Angeles Harbor resides. Senator Stephen White, another key delegate, supported the
port's development, and pushed policy for the new seaport to be designated as the
official port for Los Angeles in 1897.
The Port of Los Angeles accounts with a rich history of immigrant workers at the
original Sunkist Oranges and Starfish Tuna procession warehouses (White, 2008),
breakbulk and timber trade, rail expansion from the Union Pacific Railroad and
essential wartime efforts for Ship building in World War II. Despite these
achievements, the Port suffered from lack of uniformity and security due to no
standardization of loading cargo, and the increased frequencies of lost, damaged
cargo, and pilferage until introduction of Containerization, which would change the
way we consider the term of Globalization.

Chapter 1.2 The Revolutionary Container and the “Ideal X”
For hundreds of years, globalization has been a key driver to connect continents
across oceans, deliver commerce and trade to the people and help enhance our
capabilities and opportunities for expansion to the modern era we live in today.
Cargo was loaded as separate pieces, better known as break-bulk, which was both
labour intensive and time consuming. A major achievement to evolve break-bulk
cargo operations, was the development of the standardized container in 1956 by
Malcolm McLean. With developing the container, came the very first containership
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“the Ideal X”, a converted World War II T-2 Oil Tanker, to make its maiden voyage
from Newark, NJ to Houston, TX USA. At the time, the vessel could only hold 58,
33-foot containers. As of 2021, the largest class of container vessels from HMM Inc,
have a maximum holding capacity of 23,964 TEU’s. Throughout these past 65 years,
the ability to transport larger amounts of cargoes over greater distances, at faster
speeds, has allowed world economies to grow substantially faster, further expanding
technology, innovation, and “just in time” logistics to meet the demands of
consumers. But with this growth and expansion, also develops new dimensions of
chaos and disruptions. Both can be impacted significantly due to geo-political events
at home or abroad, environmental disasters, economic shifts or Acts of God.
Containers therefore, have had a profound and enhancing effect on port operations,
terminals and structures (Hayut, 1981).

Chapter 1.3 Disruptions in the History of the Port of Los Angeles
With the Twenty Equivalent Unit (TEU) and Forty Equivalent Unit (FEU) containers
formally standardized in the Customs Convention of Containers in 1972 under the
United Nations, Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (renamed
to IMO), and under the International Standards Organization (ISO), allowed global
commerce to become standardized and uniformed. Despite the promising features
that these modern containers provided, it was considered an unwelcoming guise for
the ILWU workers, as this would mean the potential loss of jobs, and less money to
make for simplified work. However, despite the inevitable change, work proved to
be safer, efficient and easier to load and offload cargo. In addition, with expansions
of trade and demand, commanded more labour force to work in the Port Terminals,
which provided ample growth for the economy.
But through the evolutions of seaports and the services that feed into them,
disruptions always were prevalent, whether directly impacting the port, dormant for a
period of time, or affecting other parts of the world.
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A Disruption, can be defined as an interruption of a process, system or industry
through instigations of chaotic events, such as war, terrorism, natural disasters,
political, economic instability, supply unavailability, transport delays and Labor
conflicts (Figliozzi & Zhang, 2009). With the expansion of Globalization, has led to
decreases of supply chain resilience and increases of disruptive events.
There have been many instances where disruptions have occurred at Ports in the
United States as well as at the Port of Los Angeles within the past 20 years. First, the
Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 in New York City, had
devastating ripple effects and consequences, which would forever change security
protocols, starting with the United Nation Convention of the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) in 2002 and enforced within SOLAS Chapter XI2 in 2004 (IMO, 2021). In the same year that the ISPS Code was introduced, the
2002 West Coast Port Lockout occurred, a dispute against the PMA by the ILWU in
order to support new contract demands in negotiations. The ILWU was accused of
deliberately engaging in slowing down work within the Port Terminals of Los
Angeles, as an alternative to striking (Park et. al, 2008). This caused the employers
responding to this slowdown of productivity to a complete lockout, preventing
workers to do their jobs. With the Ports (Los Angeles and Long Beach) shutdown for
12 days, estimated total economic losses of $1.67 billion USD (Anderson & Geckil,
2002; Cohen, 2002). Labor strikes would be a common occurrence over the next 10 –
15 years in 2012, 2015, 2018 and 2021 which would add to the Los Angeles Port
Terminals turmoil to control cargo flows (Monaco & Olsson, 2004; Gong & Liu,
2019; POLA, 2021). In addition, the Financial Crisis of 2008, coined the worst since
the Great Depression of 1929 (Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, 2010), disrupted cargo
flows of greater than 20% in the first quarter of 2009 container throughput
forecasting (Keenan, 2009), which imitates the same trends and disruptions currently
caused by COVID-19. With bottlenecking at the Ports of Los Angeles and Port of
Long Beach during the events of 2008-2009 Financial Crisis and the ongoing
COVID-19 Pandemic, the West Coast has lost market share to Gulf and East Coast
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Ports due to higher costs of operations and businesses in the States of California and
Washington, widening of the Panama Canal, which include Houston, TX and a new
APM Terminal at the Port of Norfolk, VA (Plunkett, 2009; O’Connell, 2020; Nacht
et. al, 2021).

Chapter 1.4 Problem Statement
Understanding that disruptions are interruptions of a systems process due to
uncontrollable cataclysmic events, can help us develop new methods of strategy to
enhance elasticity and adaptability in maintaining uninterrupted performance at Port
Terminals. One assumption, is to believe that all disruptions have a repetitive
commonality and follow similar paths in the ripple effects they create through
history. Though disruptions with COVID-19 can have similar trends as the Financial
Crisis of 2008, this is not fully the case as demonstrated earlier by Notteboom, Pallis
and Rodrigue (2021). The famous aphorism of “history doesn’t repeat itself but it
often rhymes” (Mark Twain) being one thing, another is failing to realize the vast
differences of technology, science, medicine and status of the world during each
chaotic event. For example, comparing the Spanish Influenza (A/H1N1) to the Novel
Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) and Black Death (Bubonic Plaque) against Port
Terminal Performance and Resilience, is not rational nor effective. Even though all
share similarities as global pandemics, originated from mutated natural occurring
strands in the environment, and deaths of millions (Aassve et. al, 2021), there are no
preserved performance measures or statistics, as technology was archaic. With this
argument, we can say that Resiliency Modelling is a very young, underdeveloped
and misunderstood concept which provides foundations for the Marine Terminals
that operate within Port Authorities. Despite automation, digitization, larger
portainers, larger transport volumes by ship, rail and by truck, we continue to repeat
and make the same critical mistakes. To understand why we make the same
mistakes, we need to identify key objectives to answer the current problem with how
COVID-19 has impacted Port Terminal Performance, which will be identified in the
next section.
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Chapter 1.5 Objectives of the Study
With the Port of Los Angeles contributing to 40% Market Share of West Coast Trade
and 17% Overall in the United States, and its cargo value estimated at $259 billion
USD (Chu, 2020), it is considered a critical and essential asset to the stability and
economies of both the economies of the State of California and the United States as a
whole (POLA, 2021). Combined with its neighbouring Port of Long Beach, together
provide a controlling market share of 74% for the entire West-Coast. These statistics
alone prove the worth and value of how important Port Terminals and Authorities are
for the economy. Between providing jobs, security to waterways, peaceful
expressions of world trade and the link to markets for commodities and consumables,
Ports provide an endless wealth of opportunities. But to understand the past issues of
disruptions that had affected the Port of Los Angeles, the Port Terminals within it,
and connected Supply Chains, will allow us to better develop a concrete foundation
of understanding and key objectives. The objectives for this study, is to define what
Resilience means for Port Terminals in the years of Pre-COVID (2019) Global
Pandemic (2020) and Futures (2021+), how an abnormality that occurred from
outside the country, eventually spread, entered the United States and disrupted the
entire scope of transportation systems, unbalancing import and export of
containerized goods, forced ebbs and flows of demand which exploited the failures
of proper utilization of Artificial Intelligence, vacancy and storage in warehousing,
and how learning from the collapse of the Supply Chain can teach us to build
resilience measures and procedures to enact when future disruptions begin to display
themselves.
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Chapter 1.6 Research Questions
Based on the objectives of the thesis, we can determine three critical questions to
research through the study
1. How do you measure resilience?
2. What is the impact of COVID-19 on the Port of Los Angeles, CA?
3. How can Ports implement changes in order to build and restructure its
resilience?

Chapter 1.7 Methodology
Through conducting this research, information was obtained through official web
sources (MARAD, USDOT, Port of Los Angeles, Pacific Maritime Association, Pool
of Pools, Wabtec Tower - Port Optimizer), databases, academic literature (Elsevier,
JSTOR, ScienceDirect), and peer-reviewed journals (University of Southern
California, California State University).
In order to fully identify how to define resilience, and how they apply through the
impacts of the Port of Los Angeles, we will sample and deconstruct 25 definitions
from various authors and utilize frequent terms to develop a new definition for the
study.
Once we have established and fabricated “resilience”, we will compare it against
qualitative from interviews and surveys from essential personnel working in Port
Terminals, Freight Forwarding, Warehousing, Rail, and Senior Staff of Logistics
Companies; and quantitative data from the Wabtec Port Optimizer to compare Port
of Los Angeles against the UNCTADs Port Performance Handbook. We then will
develop a lean discipline model through interviews, survey and performance data, to
construct an Analytic Hierarchy Process Model following the recommendations of
Teknomo (2006) and Loh, Zhou, Thai, Wong and Yuen (2017). In doing so, will
allow us to determine the weights of scenarios, and which decisions Senior
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Executives and Stakeholders can make in order to restore or maintain resilient
through current day disruptions and validate the answers of how COVID-19
impacted Port Terminal Performance in the United States.

Chapter 1.8 Limitations of Study
The limitations within this study, is the availability of specific information within the
Port of Los Angeles, regarding individual container terminal throughputs, total
discharge of individual shipping liners within them, average gang ton hours, average
TEU’s per hour / per terminal, crane hours and shipping liner total port times in daily
format. This information would be deemed extremely sensitive, confidential, and
unavailable for open public research. Also, with the limited time available, and
requirements of the AHP Survey, surveyors were opened to Supply Chains that
operate within Major Transportation hubs along the West and East Coasts of the
United States.

Chapter 1.9 Research Structure
The study has been organized and structured as follows:


Chapter One will briefly introduce the Port of Los Angeles’ foundation in the
late 1800’s, and how through expansion of trade, war and time, developed
into and earned the slogan of “Americas Port”. We will also cover the
historical significance to the invention of standardized containers by Malcolm
McClean and the Ideal X T-2 Tanker and also demonstrate how expansions to
Globalization has led to Supply Chains becoming less resilient and more
susceptible to disruptions.



Chapter Two is Literature Review focusing on what is Resilience, with a
constructed table of 25 definitions, and how we can reduce these to properly
define Port Terminal Resilience for the Study. We then identify Supply Chain
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Resilience, Port Performance and how these are linked to Supply Chain
Performance, Logistics Performance and the importance of Foreland and
Hinterland Connectivity.


Chapter Three will focus on developing a Resilience Framework in order to
properly address how to measure resilience, and the different segments of
complex adaptive systems theory



Chapter Four will build the Case Study of the Port of Los Angeles by
studying statistical data on Anchor Time, Days at Berth, Container
Throughput by Shipping Company, Container Throughput at the Port of Los
Angeles, Truck Transactions, Truck Turn Times, Dwell Times for Rail,
Truck and Total as well as Intermodal Cross Deck Yard and Warehousing
Congestion issues.



Chapter Five will compose of data collection through Interviews and a AHP
Questionnaire for a blend of qualitative and quantitative data. We will
compare and contrast the Qualitative AHP Data to the Quantitative Port of
Los Angeles data to finally pinpoint the issues of how COVID-19 impacts
Port Terminal Performance



Chapter Six will conclude and summarize all the information within the
study.
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CHAPTER 2 – Literature Review
Chapter 2.1 Resilience
The word “Resilience” shares multiple connotations when applied to various
conditions through physiological, sociological or industrial psychology. Since most
supply chain networks are composed of cluster nodes through various means of
intermodal services, there is no singular definition (one size fits all) of resiliency for
maritime, aviation, rail and roads. One example in terms of roadway resiliency,
would be The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956. In the United States, this Highway
Act would be the largest public works project in the nation’s entire history (GovInfo,
2018). This would provide the essential link of roads and highways between the
opposite coasts, and overall, would bolster essential economic growth and strategic
development of the interstate system through transcontinental trade. Investment in
intrastate infrastructure was due largely with rising geo-political conflicts in rising
nations of power, and the United States need to expand security and homeland
defence (Weingroff, 1996). Approximately 90% of the funding utilized was paid for
through the US Government. In short, roadway resiliency could be defined as a
transporter's ability to maintain undisrupted methods of transport during routine and
unexpected deteriorations of interstate services. But how can we effectively define
the key principles of resiliency through capable abilities, adaptability, recovery and
elasticity in vicissitudes of events at Maritime Ports and Port Terminals? The main
functions of Maritime Ports are to provide supply service for freight and ships.
However, these factors alone do not fully define the scope of activities and essential
functions.
According to Rodrigue, Notteboom and Pallis (2021), the term of resilience allows
the transportation infrastructure to cope and recover from disruptions while
maintaining operations. This is due to the transportation sector being able to view
internal and external disruptions through physical sciences, ecological sciences and
complex adaptive system theory. The Ports overall objective achieved through
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observant behaviour, is to reduce the probability of disruption, and if not successful,
mitigate potential economic impacts it will have on the maritime port and hinterland
supply chains it feeds into. Maritime Port resiliency can also vary due to the port's
overall purpose and functionality. Ports can be segregated through two methods by
Monofunctional and Polyfunctional services. Monofunctional harbours focus on
limited arrays of commodities, in which the developed infrastructure in place is
strategically designed strictly for only raw commodities or a singular product. The
Port of Los Angeles, can be viewed as a Polyfunctional Port due to its ability to
service container ships, roll on roll off (ro-ro) vessels, passenger, multi-use, maritime
support services, break-bulk and wet-dry bulk commodities. In understanding which
ports operational functions could lead to higher resiliency and mitigated disruption
over the other remains unseen. This argument can be made due to unforeseen future
events through geopolitical and geographical events. In this paper however, we will
focus on container terminals of the Port of Los Angeles.
With the introduction of the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2) in the
latter of December 2019, this introduced a new level of disruption that was not
familiar to the shipping industry since the turn of the 20th century with the 1918
Pandemic of the Spanish Flu (H1N1). Comparing the contingency factors for
Maritime Ports through both pandemics, is impossible. This is due to significant
variances of technology, economic development, existing transport infrastructure,
social sciences of medicine, methods of communication, and absence of critical data.
These factors also varied due to seaports' nationality, whether a country is fully
developed or is in development. In argument with Rodrigue, Notteboom and Pallis,
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how can we truly establish a solidified definition of Port Resiliency for the number
of constants and variables available?
Table 1
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Table 1 (Conti)
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Table 1 (Conti)
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Table 1 (Conti)

(Source: Aldunce et. al, 2014)

Chapter 2.2 Port Resilience
Notteboom, Pallis and Rodrigue (2015), discussed that despite the effects on
Logistics Supply Chains that haven’t adapted and decentralized their clusters to
compensate for disruption, COVID-19 on ports in general has had a short-lasting
shock, and of shorter scale and duration than initially expected. The shorter shocks of
disruption were due to proactive adaptation capabilities demonstrated by both
shipping alliances and the container ports in collaboration. In order for both the
shipping liners/alliances as well as the container ports to be effective, a
multidimensional approach had to be taken. First, restructuring and reorganization
within the Port Authorities to address sanitary protocols which include cleaning
equipment and operating vehicles, longer shift changeovers, rotation schemes, and
lowering the number of dock workers per shift. Also, collaboration amongst
stakeholders through integration of newer technologies, such as automation of
robotics at Port Terminals and methods of business being conducted through fully
digitized means such as wayfarer bills and automated queuing gates. Port Authorities
also adopted compensatory financial measures which include early payment to
providers due to constrained demand and suppressed by lockdowns. Delaying
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payments for users in the Port, also contributed to mitigate adverse effects of the
crisis.
To further expand this multi-dimensional approach, multi-level port resiliency
planning could be an amicable approach when involving stakeholders, operators,
agencies, firms and multiple levels of government.
Shaw, Grainger and Achuthan (2016), expressed the necessity of multi-dimensional
approaches as well with the United Kingdom’s strong dependence on imported
goods as an island nation. Specifically, the UK relies not only on strongly developed
ports, but the significance they provide whilst serving as the gateway for 97% of
overall trade for the entire country. Furthermore, these Ports are highly specialized
by commodity, with Felixstowe handling 40% of all container traffic, and it would
be quite difficult to properly replace the capabilities they provide if these services
were lost (Grainger and Achuthan, 2014).

Chapter 2.3 Supply Chain Resilience
Kamalahmadi and Parast (2015), focused on the vulnerabilities and risks of
disruptions in supply chains with the resulting growth of globalization and higher
rates of innovation. Some of the challenges focus on increased demands of
variability, shorter lifespan of products, and varied expectations from customers and
consumers. As a result of these negative consequences, businesses essential to the
economy such as Port Authorities and the terminals that operate within them to
deliver these amenities, must address the rejuvenation and adaptable structure
required to build new supply chain clusters that are resilient to disruptions. Many
more companies now find themselves at increasing risk of supply chain disruption. A
recent study by Aon Risk Solutions found that, on average, the percentage of global
companies reporting a loss of income due to a supply chain disruption increased
from 28% in 2011 to 42% in 2013 (Saenz and Revilla, 2014). Jüttner (as cited in
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Kamalahmadi and Parast, 2015, pg.1) explained that supply chain risk management
(SCRM) ‘identifies potential sources of risk and implementations of appropriate
strategies throughout coordinated approaches among risk members to reduce overall
supply chain vulnerability’. The inability for businesses to anticipate unpredictable
and unknowable events such as COVID-19, has caused irreversible damage,
bankrupted many, and left millions without jobs. Supply Chains are a viable link in
resiliency for Ports. Viability is the ability of a supply chain (SC) to maintain itself
and survive in a changing environment through a redesign of structures and
replanning of performance with long-term impacts (Ivanov, 2020). In order for the
Port of Los Angeles to properly manage their Supply Chains through COVID-19,
there needs to be a developed framework in order to guide them through deploying
risk management practices. Reconfiguring these systems will help to develop Supply
Chain Resiliency Programs.
Saenz and Revilla (2014) discuss in thorough detail the required systematic
components in order to develop a successful resiliency program. The example used
was CISCO Systems in comparison to two different periods of disruption. One was
during the events of Hurricane Katrina and the other being the Tohoku Tsunami and
Earthquake of 2011. Both were ‘Acts of God’ and uncontrollable, which could be
similarly compared to COVID-19. The only substantial differences were the affected
audience of people vs. damage to physical infrastructure. Through reconfiguring the
company's supply chains, there were 6 strategies that CISCO took in order to
prioritize maintaining undisrupted service to all clients. Foremost, CISCO identified
strategic priorities. This was comparing competitor’s particular products against the
supply chains capabilities. Decision makers within the company had to weigh the
priorities over cost or response time for particular products and services. The same
could be applied to Port Terminals, as to what cargo being imported and exported is
deemed ‘essential’. A good example of essential supplies would be Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) from manufacturers in Central Asia and the Far East.
Though these would be considered priority equipment, vaccines which have
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significantly more constraints (size of container, required temperature for storage
with uninterrupted power supply, efficacy and life-span of the medicine in days and
weeks). So, the cost in order to overnight shipments of vaccines vice, having a
16,000 TEU container ship full of essential masks, clothes, coveralls and additional
PPE arrive three weeks later, is stipulated in decision making in the strategic strategy
of supply chain design.
Mapping Vulnerabilities can be inclusive to geo-political, economic, regulatory
compliance mandates, expansions of technology, spikes of demand and supply as
well as natural disasters. Resiliency Programs for COVID-19 in comparison to
various Ports and Port Terminals in the United States can include the local state
governance and policies. In the State of California, workers who maintained a
Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC), who worked through maritime,
aviation, rail, truck and local city transport, were deemed essential personnel, and
had priority to receive the developed COVID-19 vaccines of Pfizer-BioTech and
Moderna (POLA, 2021).
Another example of vulnerabilities, was the requirements of ventilators for hospitals
all over the United States. To weight the consequences of time-delay from
manufacturing of ventilators from China or other Far East distributors, to method of
transportation due to high cost of aviation expenses or low cost but slow by surface,
United States car manufacturers such as TESLA and Ford Motor Co, utilized their
own supply chains to use car parts to manufacture ventilators for hospitals who were
at maximum capacity.
With this understanding of what the United States needed in 2020 through 2021, this
instability allowed critical supply chains to properly access the capabilities and
weaknesses of connectivity, digitization and communication with alternative
suppliers for various tiered customers. It also allowed the seaports on both East and
West coast to understand the differences in Port Congestion, Increased Turn-around

19

times, increased anchor and delay times, and inputs, throughput and output dilemmas
due to international, states and national guidelines to COVID-19 and prevention.
Furthermore, understanding the Integrating Risk Awareness into the Product and
Value Chain, monitor resiliency, and watching for events all effectively feeds into
Resiliency Planning.

Chapter 2.4 Port Performance
As a strategic asset for local and regional economies in countries around the world,
seaports must undergo constant routine self-assessments in order to know where their
strengths and weaknesses lie both in competition and in improvement during the
operating year. According to the UNCTAD Report of Port Performance Indicators
(1976), there are various methods to appropriately determine port performance
through the seaport’s own operational and financial capabilities. The importance of
these capabilities, provides collected information for planning and control by senior
level management of Port Terminals. This information can be segregated into a
functional transport chain graph, defined by maritime transport, port navigational
services, cargo handling services, cargo transit storage services and hinterland
support. For this paper, we will focus on the Cargo-handling services, as this portion
delineates with significant detail how Port Terminal Performance can be greatly
impacted by COVID-19 and other external factors.
Within Cargo-Handling Services, the 1976 report heavily focuses on financial
indicators due to when cargo handling is lower or higher due to economic and yearly
predicated trends. Some contingency options include increased market promotion to
attract new customers, raising tariffs to increase revenue, measures to raise
productivity and readjustments of deferrable budgeted expenditures. For the
operational aspect of Port Performance, UNCTAD defines Arrival Rate, Waiting
Time, Service Time, Turn-round Time, Tonnage per Ship, Fraction Time, Number of
Gangs employed per ship per shift, Tons Per Gang-hour and Fraction of Time gangs
idle as measurements of performance. While these are considerable measures for
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beginning to map performance evaluation, the report is missing critical information
which involves the utilization of capital equipment times. This information can be
further segregated and richly delineated through crane hours, containers offloaded
per hour, truck pulls and turnaround times, que times for trucks, gate transactions,
and railing information. These can be measured up to the point of departure, where
additional performance measures will need to be factored specifically for rail,
warehouse storage capacity and processing, with further importing into the country’s
economy.
In 1987 under the UNCTAD Monographs on Port Management, the previous Port
Performance Indicators report was further updated. First, Port Performance Measures
were further expanded upon to include quality of cargo-handling equipment and the
service to inland transport vehicles during passage through ports (De Monie, 1987).
This solves the issue with major world ports publishing their reports on ‘productivity
in ports’ without mentioning a single factual performance or productivity measure or
figure.

Chapter 2.5 Definition of Resilience for the Study
In understanding definitions of Resilience, the most common descriptions of the
word span from positive attributes of ability, capability, mechanism, systems and
synonyms of action and optimism; with negative connections to hazards, dangers,
disasters and stress. To define Port resilience in terms of this study, we can identify 4
key definitions of the original 25 selected aspects of Resilience.
The most influential definitions of the word resilience, effectively capture a synopsis
of physical, psychological, sociological and environmental affluences. In
summarizing these four key definitions, we can form a new definition for Resilience
in application to the Case Study.
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Table 2

(Source: Aldunce et. al, 2014; Author, 2021)

The most influential definitions of the word resilience, effectively capture a synopsis
of physical, psychological, sociological and environmental affluences. In
summarizing these four key definitions, we can form a new definition for Resilience
in application to the Case Study. Resilience can be defined as effective coordination
and communication of Port and Supply Chain Systems, to maintain optimal services
through disruptive shocks. In addition, by implementing lessons learned from
previous periods of disruption, we can effectively utilize adaptable intermodal
transport systems, warehousing vacancy, capital equipment, all while eliminating
sacrifices to overall security and system(s) integrity.
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CHAPTER 3 – Resilience Framework
Chapter 3.1 How to Measure Resilience
When measuring Resilience, in all cases through physiological, sociological or
industrial aspects, resilience shares a common flow of decline, sustainability and
recovery from a disturbance or disruption, to either return from previous levels or
surpass and rise to better numbers. To deeply interpret these four phases, Rodrique
et. all (2021), identified a set of observative sciences which can fully construct
analysis data through physical, ecological sciences and complex adaptive systems
theories. Out of the three choices for observative sciences, Complex Adaptive
Systems Theory (CAST) is the most appropriate approach to develop a cognisant,
highly detailed and specialized focus system for the Port of Los Angeles. In doing so,
we can determine the links of resilience, and the weak points where disruptions can
regularly occur and thrive if not corrected.

Figure 2: Resilience Framework (Source: Rodrique et. al, 2021; Schneider & Somers, 2006)

Through CAST, we can model the recirculated critical systems of the six Port
Terminals, which control daily flows of commerce and exports of goods. These key
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attributes, are always subject to feedback and regularity influences of disruption,
which can be explained through CASTs three essential parts of Nonlinear Dynamics,
Chaos Theory and Adaptation and Evolutions (Schneider & Somers, 2006).
Finally, in understanding these components and the system model of Port Terminals,
will allow us to properly apply these theories to visualize three dimensions of
resilient systems. These are Absorptive, Adaptive and Restorative Capacities.
Merging the findings from Rodrique et al. (2021) with Schneider & Somers (2006),
we can develop an effective Resiliency Framework.

Chapter 3.2 Complex Adaptive Systems Theory
When we define the word “Complex” or “Complexity”, we are referring to the interrelationship and inter-connectivity of elements within a system and the surrounding
environment (Chan, 2001). In this phase of complexity in terms of both interrelationships and interconnectivity, CAST suggests that the most productive state for
this system lies at the ‘edge of chaos’, where there is maximum variety and creativity
available (Health Foundation, 2010). Within a Ports Infrastructure System, lie the
Agents, which includes Labor Forces, Marine Terminal Operators, Port Authority
Executives, Rail Operating Companies, Warehousing and 3PL Services. These are
all interconnected sub-components to various echelons of government, regardless of
geographic location. Through this hierarchy, the interconnected networks are
designed to rely on one another, and through applying adaptable resilience strategies
to each of these sub-components, allows the freedom and flexibility to orchestrate
solutions and controls when disruptions start to overwhelm branched connections in
the model. These disruptions, can be generated internally and externally from their
surrounding environments (Oughton et. al, 2018). However, the edge of chaos
depends on the Operational Decisions, Interventions and choices each subcomponent makes. If one makes an incorrect decision on how to manage and control
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disruptions, the entire linkage of the supply chain will fail, and a new strategy must
be implemented to regain lost control.

Figure 3: Complex Adaptive System Model (Source: Oughton et. al, 2018)

This demonstration of CAST (Figure 3), allows the Port Terminals to maintain a
constant flow of energy to maintain the performance of a system, in which this case,
how to continuously move containers forward and reverse rapidly and direct to and
from ship to markets, with eliminating rail and highway congestion, and
warehousing which can provide the ample space required for storage and movement
of goods. If Container Terminal capacity becomes significantly reduced at a Port
Facility due to congestion, the Port Authority may look to temporarily rent allocated
surplus space within close vicinity, to move excess containers away, and eventually
recirculate back into the supply chain. Another strategy for utilizing multiple rail
lines in synchronized directions to optimize cargo flows, vice only using one or two
dedicated channels. This is considered inter-communication and coordination
through established connections of the CAST to be elastic and flexible in order to
adapt for short periods of time before returning to normal cargo configurations.
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Chapter 3.2.1 Nonlinear Dynamics
Another component of CAST, is understanding the variables of nonlinear
dynamics in contrast to developments which could escalate to chaos theory.
Nonlinear Dynamics can be described as multidimensional vectors within an
information feed-back system (Wilding, 1998). All series of logistics and
supply chain systems, including Port Terminals, are made up of these series
of feedback control loops. These systems exist, when the environment, such
as market demand and supply, develop into decision making processes, which
results in actions directed by businesses, which impact the same
environments and influence future decision making. This is a continuous,
renewable process with re-emerging positives and consequences. Though this
theory appears chaotic, unpredictable and counterintuitive, the behaviour in
which feedback loops work, isn’t random and can become recurrent overtime
if not fully understood (Thompson & Steward, 2002). On one hand, examples
include the number of containers loaded from multiple shipping liners
through shipping alliances to cover blank sailings, as well as on the other
hand, the relationship between available inventory which impacts shipment
rates from warehousing.

Figure 4: Example of a Container Terminal Queueing Model (Source: Canonaco et. al, 2007)

26

It is also, necessary to devise models to evaluate performances of container
terminals through nonlinear programming and dynamic modelling. According
to Aleesandri, Cervellera Cueno, Gaggero and Soncin (2009), with
considerable growth of container shipping, it become crucial to maintain
efficient management within container terminals. There are methods such as
queuing theory, which was developed by Agner Krarup Erlang in order to
address delays of telephone wait times through phone switchboards in the
early 1900’s (Heyde, 2001). In modern times, Queueing Theory has been
used to evaluate port terminal performance measures (e.g., Figure 4), by
determining the optimal number of berths based on occupational times, rates
at which how often the berth is vacant or utilized, expected wait times for
vessels, as well as truck gate times with the number of truck lanes to teller
booths available to complete transactions (de la Peña-Zarzuelo et. al, 2020).
In summary, nonlinear systems admit multiple solutions through multiple
scenarios of behaviours, which when aggregated beyond controllable levels,
can develop into Chaos Theory.

Chapter 3.2.2 Chaos Theory and the Butterfly Effect
CAST Modelling also factors into account the consequences of Chaos
Theory. As a directional flow of nonlinear systems at extremes, Chaos
Theory can be defined as a dynamic state of confusion or disorder, which
erratically evolves over the two fundamental subjects of change and time,
through processes of mathematical dynamic systems (Williams, 1997).
Chaos Theory carries multiple characteristics, which have serious
implications to Supply Chain Management. According to Wilding (1998), the
three which are most relevant to supply chain disruptions are sensitivity to
conditions, aperiodic behaviour, and pattern generations.
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Sensitivity can be seen as a centralized concept of Chaos Theory, though this
doesn’t automatically imply chaos. Small errors are amplified exponentially
to a point until there is no distinct means to differentiate between disruptions.
The only way to detect chaos, is through Lyapunov exponents. Through
calculations of propagation, a system can be determined chaotic if one
positive Lyapunov exponent is present, while a negative would return as a
stable system. This has been demonstrated through various linkages of the
Supply Chain for the Port of Los Angeles, particularly warehousing, rail and
chassis dwell times (Martin, 2021).
Aperiodic Behaviour can be described as irregular oscillations that do not
exponentially grow, retract or move within a steady state of motion. Such
examples could be compared and contrasting information from various global
markets and analytics, such as NYSE, NASDAQ, Dow Jones Industrial
Averages. Maritime Analytics can also be applied through freight indexes,
stocks, new build and scrap prices and orderbooks, which can be observed
through research information systems such as Clarksons, Shipnet ONE, and
Spire Analytics.
When we forecast Chaos Theory in computer simulation, we can see that
despite chaos’ irregular behaviours of randomized data, it produces similar
patterns within its data. Though these never repeat as exact same copies of
one another, but carry distinct characteristic properties. Snowflakes are
perfect examples of this replication of irregular behaviour through its
interactions with the environment during formation, also known as attractors.
These represent microscopic tears and disturbances, which are amplified until
the full pattern is formed.
COVID-19 being classified as a Global Pandemic by the World Health
Organization in March of 2020 (WHO, 2020), can be seen as a Chaotic
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System. Strong evidence supporting this through random disorders of
customer demands for products, inability to rapidly manufacture these same
products, and inability to restock these items at the same rates at which they
are being depleted. Commodities such as Personal Protective Equipment,
Toilet Paper and Sanitizing Products were rapidly depleted from grocery and
convenience stores. These small ripple effects within the timeframe of the
beginning of COVID in November 2019 to April 2021, have evolved into
multiple butterfly effects. These effects, though initially small, transpire to
significant uncontrollable events. With Amazon Warehouses being depleted
from consumers staying at home, lack of laborers at warehousing, and
restrictions of social gatherings and activities, forced the logistics company to
hire 100,000 additional workers in order to compensate for uncontrollable
demand flows (Barrero et. al, 2020).
Chaos Theory can also be influenced by Geo-Political Events, such as
disruptions with major trade partners of the United States. These could
include engaging in acts of war, invading and annexing adjacent countries,
and completely blocking and embargoing trade. These few factors alone,
could put significant strains on the relationships between the United States,
the United Nations, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations,
and host nations that feed into them.
In summarizing Complex Systems Theory, through Nonlinear Dynamics and
Chaos Theory, there are four simplified methods that can be implemented, for
management operating through and to remove chaos, as demonstrated in the
following examples (Wilding, 1997):


Long term planning is very difficult, focus on short term forecasts. It
is better to allocate resources for developments of short-term effective
decision making, rather than long term. For Port Terminals, focus on
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how to correct short fall deficiencies, whether gate congestion, dwell
times and rail, if capacity and containers per hour are not immediate
threats.


Focus on the market, by communicating information as far upstream
through the supply chain as possible and adopt leaner approaches to
make operations streamline and fit.



Treat the supply chain as one complete system, and not segments.
Port Terminals and Authorities are connected to endless branches of
logistics. Small changes to optimize one component may result in
massive changes to other parts.



Realize that supply chains never achieve stable equilibrium, small
perturbations will always be present in demand and supply markets,
as well as influences from global events.

Understanding these elements, we can complete our resiliency framework by
implementing absorptive and remaining capacity, adaptive capacity, adaptive
resilience, and restorative capacity measures within our terminals.

Chapter 3.3 Absorptive and Remaining Capacity
Absorptive Capacity is the ability of a mode or terminal to absorb disruptions
or stall chaos while maintaining levels of service. Some examples of this, is
supply within warehousing that is meeting the current demand cycle of the
consumers, but is not actively or rapidly being replenished at a rate which
could equalize or add surplus to the demand cycle. The remaining capacity, is
the amount or level remaining that a Port Terminal or Supply Chain System
can manage on its own before complete failure
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Chapter 3.3.1 Adaptive Capacity
Adaptive Capacity, is when a Port Terminal can route and reroute cargo
through different nodes and segments during a disruption in order to maintain
a level of service (Rodrique et. al, 2021). As reflected in our AHP Model in
Chapter 6, we will analyse Infrastructure, Planning and Port Labor, which
contain criteria relevant to expanding our adaptive capacity. These include,
Road & Rail, Communications, Coordination and a Flexible Workforce.
This could mean that if on-dock railing would become severely congested
due to bottlenecks at Intermodal Cross Deck Stations, or scarcity of rail
chassis by increased dwell times a container, that the port would utilize more
trucks in order to appropriately move more container flows outside the port
and to either warehousing or directly to market. It could also mean, if the
congestion was significant enough to disrupt both truck and rail, and if in
extreme cases were to cause weeks of delays, traffic could be rerouted to
other ports or transhipment on smaller ships or barges could be utilized.
Adaptive Capacity is a reaction to remaining capacity, in order to keep the
system sustainable and functional.

Chapter 3.3.2 Adaptive Resilience
Adaptability in general, is the ability to adjust to new conditions (Oxford,
2021). These abilities to adjust and necessary, in order to interact
dynamically between Port and Supply Chain Systems, is critical to control
and prevent disruptions. Utilizing the 4 tiers of Port Terminal Resilience, we
can modify our operational methods, including the working relationships
between Marine Terminal Operators, Longshoremen, Warehousemen, Rail
Companies and Drayman. One of the largest priorities that we have learned
through the COVID-19 Pandemic, is the ability to maintain a sustainable
workforce. Whether demand is scarce or heightened due to surges in demand,
laborers such as highly skilled and qualified operators for heavy capital
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equipment, efficient gang teams, and other labour systems within a port are
irreplaceable, even with the introduction of automation.
For terminals with automation, well-trained and qualified personnel are still
required, all whom are expected to know each component, system, control
and how to react when this fails.

Chapter 3.3.3 Restorative Capacity
A ports Restorative Capacity, is its ability to return to a service level similar
to or better than previous evaluated performance measures recorded prior to
disruptions or chaotic events. This can be effectively modelled through trends
of seasonality, annual changes in GDP growth and decline, globalized
index’s, inflation, and market share of import/export by country. Restorative
Capacity is a critical part of Maritime Transportation Systems (MTS) (Figure
5), because it symbolizes time, returned and/or gained capacity. With
utilizing market modelling and aggregating a ports restorative capacity, will
allow decision makers the insight to see the strength of their resiliency
frameworks.

Figure 5: Modification Resilience of Maritime Transportation Systems (Source: Rodrique et. al, 2021)
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CHAPTER 4 – Modelling the Case Study: The Port of Los
Angeles, CA
To understand how disruptions, such as COVID-19 have impacted the Port of Los
Angeles, we need to analyse series of events which occurred from January 2019 to
April 2021. With almost three years of data, we can thoroughly map out events that
caused disruptions through Labor Disputes, Geo-Political Strains, shutdowns and
lockouts of manufacturing facilities, COVID-19, and the aggressive measures the
United States introduced through stimulus packages, unemployment assistance, pay
check protection programs, loan forgiveness, bail-out loans for major corporations
and funding to state and local governments. The culmination of all these events,
contributed to the initial disruption of Port Terminal Performance at the Port of Los
Angeles, to April 2021’s record setting cargo volumes in the Ports entire history.

Chapter 4.1 Declining Affairs and Premonition of Global Disruption
With the state of affairs in the United States in 2018, the 45th elected
President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, initiated several aggregated
raises of tariffs specifically on steel and aluminium on top exporting
countries and specifically with China, in order to correct the $330 billion
USD trade gap (Kapustina et. al, 2020). The United States also raised its
tariffs on Chinese imports of textiles, machinery imports and apparel. In
response to be competitive, China initiated lower tariffs for other countries
within geographical range, and increased tariffs on the United States,
strategically targeting critical exports of Agricultural Goods (wheat,
soybeans, corn, cotton, dairy, nuts, prepared food products, pork and beef
products). On May 10, 2019, before the G20 Summit, the Trump
administration initiated a 25% tariff increase towards China, which would
take full effect at the end of the year in December (Itakura, 2019). Escalation
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of this war, has contributed to the largest welfare loss of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) for China by -1.41% and -1.35% for the US respectively.
With many businesses and fashion industries relying on cheaper
manufacturing of production through China, and with the predicted demands
of seasonality’s of summer, back to school, fall, and American holiday’s,
businesses ordered surplus of products in order to guarantee supply, and to
receive these orders before the increased tariffs were placed into effect as
well before the Chinese New Year. In a Report ‘By the Numbers’ issued by
the Port of Los Angeles (2019), is a full comprehensive study on how the USChina Trade War tariffs will impact the Port of Los Angeles as well as the
entire economy of the United States. At the time, Executive Director for the
Port of Los Angeles, Gene Seroka, went to Washington D.C. during a news
conference with stakeholders to discuss these findings and proceedings (Port
of Los Angeles, 2019, 9:28). Simultaneously, with no response politically
from all levels of US Government to urge lowering the tariffs, the first
recorded case of COVID-19 in December occurred in Wuhan, China (WHO,
2020). This would begin the emergence of the world-wide pandemic.

Chapter 4.2 Emergence and Rise of COVID-19 to Global Pandemic
As mentioned earlier, Chaos Theory derives from a series of unchecked
disruptions that leads to severely impacting nonlinear systems. These three
terms are Sensitivity to Conditions, Aperiodic Behaviour and Pattern
Generation. With the combination of the Port of Los Angeles being subjected
to the US Governments implemented tariff policies, accelerated declining of
west-coast market share of China manufactured imports to the east-coast
ports of the United States (Johnson, 2020; O’Connell, 2020), holiday season
both in the United States and in China, and the Federal Maritime
Commission’s investigation against shipping carriers rejecting US
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Agricultural export containers at the Port of Los Angeles, which further
extended the US-China Trade Gap (LaRocco, 2021). All of these small ripple
effect disruptions introduced onto the Port System, would amplify through
the introduction of COVID-19. This invisible adversary would become the
catalyst for logistics hardships and transport uncertainties from 2020
onwards, as nations struggled to regain control and improvise resilient
strategies.
In 2020, the Chinese New Year (Lunar New Year) started on the evening of
January 24th, and typically lasts for 2-3 weeks until the rise of the full moon
(Chinese New Year | Summary, History, Traditions, & Facts, n.d.). In
addition to the New Year, the travel season known as Chunyun, occurs two
weeks prior to the New Year and extends for a period of 40 days, with limited
to no manufacturing plants being operational. With an estimated 440 million
passengers expected to travel through China by all intermodal modes,
controlling and containing the spread of the coronavirus outbreak would be
difficult (Lee, 2020).
With the first case of COVID-19 emerging in Washington State on the WestCoast of the United States and several days later, the Chinese Government
imposed quarantines and strict lockdowns on Hubei, Zhejiang, Liaoning and
Jiangxi provinces in order to isolate the epicentre of the coronavirus (AJMC,
2021); which posed a serious threat to global trade and transportation. Social
Distancing was practiced by cancelling many events, gatherings, closing of
public places, schools and universities, and people forced to stay at home,
which meant shut down of manufacturing plants and facilities for exports
(Lau et. al, 2020). Eventually, many countries including the United States,
issued travel bans. With lockdowns imposed, shifts in demand of consumer
goods increased.
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While China continued to increase the scope of its lockdowns in adjacent
providences, the Labor force for the Port of Los Angeles would be returning
to work near the end of January, despite the growing spread of the COVID19, only to be welcomed to follow on disruptions.
As a guest speaker on CNBC’s regularly broadcasted morning show “Squawk
Box”, Executive Director of POLA Gene Seroka, explained that 40 vessel
sailings were cancelled from February 11th to April 1st of 2020, which
represents 25% of normal vessel call during that period of time. In addition,
strong uncertainties that cargo volumes will resume at regular volumes for
March (CNBC: Pain at the Ports; Virus Fallout for Shippers, 2020, 1:16). In
a follow-on Los Angeles City Council Meeting on March 4th 2020, the
Executive Director explained the various economic disruptions occurring at
the Port of Los Angeles. This includes reiterating the large cancelled sailings,
and record declining cargo throughput from October to December 2020 (Q4)
of 16% and January 1st to March 1st 2021 (QI) at 15-17% down from the
previous year due to the US-China Tariffs in place. In addition, with the Port
conducting half of all the trade business to and from China, the impact felt is
significant, with manufacturing production throughout China operating at
40% of normal levels. This takes into account energy consumption, pollution
measurements and traffic patterns. Adjacent South East Asia trading partners,
such as Japan, South Korea and Vietnam, are trading at irregular heightened
levels in order to compensate for the decline of business from China. (Port of
Los Angeles Executive Director City Council Presentation, 2019, 1:11). The
effects of the cancelled sailings, would impact dockworkers (ILWU), as with
their coastwide contracts with the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA),
would receive their salaries through the paid guarantee program, meaning
that they were being paid to stay at home during COVID-19.
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One week later from the Los Angeles City Council Meeting, the World
Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic (WHO, 2020).
At the end of March, the Chinese Government began to allow reopening and
production of manufactured goods for export to resume, which in turn,
caused increased sailings in order to compensate for several months of losses.
This rebounded the Chinas Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index (PMI)
to 52.0pts, a measurement of economic activities in the Chinese
Manufacturing Sector, from a -17.0pt. (35.0pt) drop in February statistics (see
Appendix A) (McMorrow, 2020; (Purchasing Managers Index for March
2021, 2021). However, the slow accumulation of workers returning to work
sites led to large manufacturing and logistics Labor shortages
At the same time, the Port of Los Angeles was having issues with
accumulated capacity of empty containers, backlogs of aggregated US
agricultural exports, perishable commodities meant for South East Asia due
to lack of dock workers, truck drivers and cancelled sailings (Smith, 2020).
These series of events induced by COVID-19, exposed and exploited
globalized trades sensitivity, by pinpointing weaknesses in the entire supply
chain and inducing irregular bullwhip effects. With no quick way to cure and
contain the spread of COVID, the Port of Los Angeles from March 2020,
would experience many disruptions and challenges to their Port Operations
and overall logistics resilience. These will be covered in the follow-on subchapter.
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Chapter 4.3 Foreland Disruption
The Foreland, refers to the area where ocean-wise linkage occurs between Ports and
International Markets by Shipping Services. As the world is covered by 71% water,
transport by surface is significantly cheaper, more economical, transport capacity of
ships is easier to manage and substantial potential for revenue through freight
transport. Disruptions which occur in this section of the Supply Chain are usually
caused by over-capacity of anchorages, storms and environmental abnormalities,
limited and reduced port access, and cancelled sailings.
Utilizing statistical figures from Appendices B, C, and F, we can reference how
Foreland Disruptions have contributed to degraded Port Terminal Performance, and
link the study to the Port of Los Angeles.
During the months of February and March of 2019 (see Appendix B), Vessels at
anchor exceeded the number of departures and vessels at berth. This was due to the
ILWU strikes against APM Terminals and PMA’s motion to have a necessary coastal
development permit which would help implement zero and near-zero emissions
automated equipment as well as reduction of emissions associated with drayage
hauling at AMPT Pier 400. In a report issued by the Vice President & General
Council of APM Terminals Pacific LLC, Peter Jabbour (2019), raises arguments that
this not only follows the Port Master Plan, Coastal Act, and numerous state and local
environmental plans, policies and requirements, but has the support and approval
from the Executive Director of the Port of Los Angeles and the Pacific Maritime
Association. It is also noted that cargo volumes dropped significantly, along with
truck throughput times and gate transactions due to the strikes. Despite opposition
from the ILWU, the permit was still issued. Five months later, APM and the ILWU
came to an agreement after six-month long negotiations to establish a program to
educate and train longshoremen, in order to maintain and repair the new automated
cargo-handling equipment, ensuring the workers keep their jobs, while contributing
to cleaner air management (Mongelluzzo, 2019).
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The following year, with COVID-19 introduced, similar statistics on the West-Coast
in early February of 2020, demonstrated the impacts of the Governors issued statewide lockdowns and shutdowns in March, accumulated 40 cancelled sailings, scaled
back workforce, and in all eliminated vessels at anchor. With no vessels to work on,
laborers were forced to stay at home, and under their coast-wide contract, along with
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act, a $2.2 Trillion
USD relief package, provided additional immediate direct payments to eligible US
Citizens (116th Congress, 2020).

Figure 6: Vessels at Anchor or Drifting outside the Port of Los Angeles (Source: Marine Traffic, 2021)

Until manufacturing was restored, and more ships were sent from South West Asia
Ports, anchorage wait times would sharply increase from two days, to weeks, while
the number of ships at anchor became stagnate at 20 to 25 vessels on average for the
Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach (Executive T.M, 2021), from December of
2020 to March 2021. This was due not only for COVID-19 quarantine measures
enforced by the United States Coast Guard, but shifts of irregular disruptions from
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within the cargo terminals and bottlenecking through failures of rail, truck and
warehousing, as well as surges of positive cases for COVID-19, climaxing during the
Christmas season in Los Angeles County, reaching a record of 74,000 new cases in
one day (Lin, 2021).

Chapter 4.4 Port Terminal Disruption
With anchored vessels accumulating to the point of gridlock outside the Ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach, and shipping companies having to drift or reroute their
vessels to ports farther north to offload containerized cargo, this posed a significant
threat of sustainability and longevity for the Southern California Port Terminals.
The same chaotic effect, was occurring in the Port of Shanghai, with the port heavily
congested with shipping containers and metal imports, warehouses overflowing with
newly manufactured goods due to lack of trucks and chassis, as well as factories not
operating at full capacity due to lack of critical components to maintain essential
machinery (Bradsher & Chokshi, 2020).
Table 3

(Source: POLA Official Website*, 2021)

The Port of Los Angeles is comprised of six container terminals, with two operating
companies (Yang Ming and China Shipping) jointly occupying the same water space
known as the West Basin Container Terminal (WBCT). The seaport operates as a
landlord port with more than 200 leaseholders, and generates revenue from leasing
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and shipping services. The capabilities and limitations of each terminal, are listed in
(Table 3).
In a research analysis completed by Martin Associates (2021) for the Pacific
Maritime Association, the key constraints identified for the overall decline of Port
Terminal Performance within the Port of Los Angeles, was pinpointed to hyperinflated cargo volumes, amount of Labor hours worked by terminal per month,
number of Labor gangs cancelled or not ordered, container dwell times by month
(truck and rail) and truck turn times by terminal. Supporting data is also available
from the Wabtec Port Optimizer, Los Angeles Harbourmasters Office, Pacific
Merchant Shipping Association, Pacific Maritime Association, Pool of Pools, Harbor
Trucking Association and several other Maritime Analytic Firms.
Statistics for additional Port Performance Measures defined in the UNCTAD Port
Management Series Vol. 4, UNCTAD Monographs on Port Management 1987, and
UNCTAD Port Performance Indicators 1976; were limited for this case study due to
information confidentiality with the Port of Los Angeles, and limited availability of
data through state and local records of California as defined in the Freedom of
Information Act (EPA, 2021).

Figure 7: Container Throughput for the Port of Los Angeles (Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer for POLA, 2021)
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Hyper-Inflated Cargo Volumes at the Port of Los Angeles (Figure 7), were caused by
the backlogs of South East Asia Exports destined for the local economy of
California, as well for Distribution Facilities which would forward this freight
through the Union Pacific and Burlington North Santa Fe Rail Lines, through
Chicago, Illinois and the rest of the United States. With the additional income
received through various programs by the CARES Act, such as stimulus spending
and payment protection programs (PPP) (116th Congress, 2020), shifted demands for
manufactured goods for entertainment, home items, sanitation, as well as goods
provided through E-Commerce Websites.
In conjunction with increases of demand from consumers, ILWU hours increased in
response to this volume growth. However, reflected in (Figure 8), production per
ILWU hour worked began to decline while TEU levels rose, which strongly reflects
terminal congestion during the initial surge of April 2020 to September 2020, as well
as lack of Labor Force available due to qualifications and status within the Union.

Figure 8: Comparison of TEU Levels and ILWU Hours at San Pedro Bay Ports (Port of Los Angeles and Port of
Long Beach) (Source: Pacific Maritime Association, 2021)

On-Terminal Congestion, is a reflection of the growth of on-street dwell times of
trucks. This number is measured by chassis turns, which is the movement to and from
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transload facilities. Eventually with congestion and reduced vacancy of space at these
transload facilities, led to less truck turns per day. Cargo being offloaded from ships,
and not being pulled from the terminals, which congest and reduce the reserve
container capacity of the Port, forcing extended dwell times inside the Terminals.

In (Figure 9), note that dwell times within all Port Terminals, exceed the Labor Hours,
which strongly supports heightened on-street dwell times, and congestion at regional
transload and distribution Centers. The significantly reduced number of rail-moves per
day through the Alameda Corridor, also greatly impacted Port Terminal Performance.
Capital Equipment issues, were not raised as a factor contributing to the decline, but
rather the lack of capacity and reduced Labor in general to efficiently move the cargo.
Labor was able to respond to terminal volume demands, however the breakdown of
the efficiency and stability of the supply chain through off-terminal logistics,
contributed to terminal and vessel congestion.

Figure 9: San Pedro Bay Port Terminal Dwell Time / Terminal Congestion (During COVID-19 Pandemic)
(Source: Pacific Maritime Association, 2021)

43

Reflected in (Figure 10) as for the number of container ships at the Port of Los
Angeles, on average the number of cancelled or non-order Labor gangs ranged
between 10% to 35% between fall and winter seasonality periods in 2020. This also
coincides with the highest infection rates of COVID-19 (Appendix, X), and
disruptions from rail pulls. These cancelled Labor gangs was due to overcapacity of
container yards at the Port Terminals, and the lack of trucks to properly distribute
them further up the supply chain.

Figure 10: Daily Share of Container Ships at Berth Not Using Labor (Port of Los Angeles-Long Beach) (Source:
Pacific Maritime Association, 2021)

Automated Terminals at the Port of Los Angeles, which include the TraPac Terminal
(Fully), and Pier 100 of APM Terminals (Partial), have shown significant advantages
over traditionally manned terminals during the past two years (Figure 11) (PMA,
2021). TEU’s moved per hour had nearly doubled in comparison between May 2019
to July 2019, and tripled during heightened container volumes through the COVID19 Pandemic (June 2020 to September 2020) despite ongoing disruptions in the
terminals. Supportive reasoning for improved performance is due to programmed
precision accuracy and efficiency, which drives TEU productivity and reduced
degrees of error during cargo operations. Other factors include improved safety, and
reduced berthing times for vessels.
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Figure 11: Automated Terminal vs. Traditional Terminal Performance (During COVID-19 Pandemic) (Source:
Pacific Maritime Association, 2021)

Chapter 4.5 Truck Disruption
As Port Terminals became overwhelmed with container capacity issues due to supply
chain congestion, it became critical to assess how to alleviate Truck Turn-times
within the Port Terminals in Los Angeles. With nowhere to offload and transfer
containerized goods to transload domestic containers, container street dwell-times
exceeded standards defined by the Pool of Pools (POP), a multi-pool agreement
between three major marine container chassis pools. These pools are Direct
ChassisLink Pools (DCLP), Flexi-Van Central Chassis Pool (FCCP), and TRAC
Intermodal (TPSP).
The services these three pools provide for the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach,
is interoperability of their chassis across start/stop locations in the Los Angeles
County Area. Under the POP, authorized truck drivers of any pool, can utilize any of
the combined chassis from within the fleet. These were the findings observed and
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concluded from POP, PMSA, Harbor Trucking Association and the Wabtec Port
Optimizer.
From a study within the Port Terminals, Truck Turn Times at the start of the
COVID-19 Pandemic, averaged 35 to 75 minutes during Shift 1 (0700 – 1600) and
35 to 100 minutes during Shift 2 (1800 – 0200). APM Terminals, the largest terminal
complex at the Port of Los Angeles, consistently carried the highest Truck
Throughput Times, at one point reaching over 160 minutes during the climax of port
congestion in Fall of 2020. This impact, is reflected earlier in (Figure 8) and (Figure,
9), due to Dwell Times exceeding TEU/ILWU Hours, Cancelled Labor Gangs for
offloading ships (Figure 10), lack of chassis, and accelerating on-street dwell times
for truck and rail chassis. TraPac Terminal, outperformed all five other terminals
consistently with their automated terminal, averaging 35 to 50 minutes during peak
summer congestion periods.
However, several terminals took immediate action to offset disruptions and improve
performance, through semi-automated operation. Fenix Marine Services (FMS)
developed and launched a new Auto In-Gate (AIG) program in mid-April, reducing
trucker queueing by 84% and aggressively lowering overall truck turn times at the
terminal (Mongelluzzo, 2020). This is reflected strongly in (Figure 12). At the same
time, Everport (ETS), underwent capital equipment, gate and terminal upgrades for
performance improvements, which is also accounted for in (Figure 12) and (Figure
13) (Smith, 2020).
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Figure 12: Port Terminals of Los Angeles - Average Truck Turn Times (Shift 1) (Source: Wabtec Optimizer, 2021)

Figure 13: Port Terminals of Los Angeles - Average Truck Turn Times (Shift 2) (Source: Wabtec Optimizer, 2021)
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When Warehousing vacancy within Los Angeles reached an all-time low of less than
1.5%, on-street container times exceeded 8 to 10 days (Figure 14). This meant that
truck chassis could not properly discharge cargo within containers to swap for
transload containers (53 ft. Standard Intermodal) therefore preventing the chassis
from being better utilized. This applied to both TEU and FEU chassis within the
POP. In addition to under-utilized container chassis, remaining chassis within the
POP became exceedingly scarce. This was due to peak surge demands at the
terminals, having not only overwhelmed reserve capacity of equipment at the
start/stop points, but adding significant stress to equipment, ultimately putting many
chassis out of service (Appendix F.13). With less chassis available for trucks, meant
less trucks available to move containers. Dislocated chassis moves (chassis picked up
from one POP and returned to another) and containers, have also added additional
strain to load cargo for export (Appendix F.12). To respond to the disruption of
chassis scarcity, POP developed a temporary start/stop yard for returns of bare
chassis and empty containers, closer to the Port of Los Angeles. The goal to reduce
the scope and distances of chassis from the terminals, assisting in increased
timeliness and efficiency (Mongelluzzo, 2020, Tuthill, 2020). At its implementation
in December 2020, Truck Turn-Times at all terminals began to improve.

Figure 14: Street Dwell Times for Truck Chassis and Containers (Source: Pool of Pools, 2021)
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Chapter 4.6 Rail Disruption
In the San Pedro Bay Port Complex (Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach), there are
three major rail-lines that feed into the Ports and provide intermodal rail service
through Los Angeles County and the rest of the United States. These rail lines
include Burlington North Santa Fe (BNSF), Union Pacific (UP) and the Alameda
Corridor which run directly to transient container yards. For the case-study, we will
focus and analyse the disruptions within the Alameda Corridor, as data is not
available for BNSF and UP. Following the data from PMSA and the Alameda
Corridor Transportation Authority, we came to the following conclusions.

Figure 15: Port Cluster and Alameda Corridor (Source: Rodrique, 2006; Railway Age, 2019)

In (Figure 16,17), the average number of trains per day on the Alameda Corridor,
was at its historical lowest in 20 years during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Data for
dwell times for Intermodal Containers waiting for Rail Chassis, was only recently
collected by PMSA, but captures an alarming rate of increase wait times from 8 days
in January 2021, to 12 days in April. This is due to declines of warehousing vacancy,
and processing, which under-performs the chassis to hold queued cargo for
discharge, as well as builds the que for new containers to be replaced on the chassis
at transient yards and within Port Terminals. The threshold for optimal chassis
recycling, was surpassed from September 2020 to February 2021, as reflected in
(Figure 18) on the following page.
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Figure 16: Alameda Corridor (Historic Data – Average Number of Trains Per Day) (Source: ACTA, 2021)

Figure 17: Rail Dwell Time in Days (Port of Los Angeles and Port of Long Beach) (Source: PMSA, 2021)

Figure 18: Dwell Times in Day % > 5 Days (Source: PMSA, 2021)
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To alleviate and correct the imbalance of rail chassis, Intermodal Equipment
Providers (IEPs) have been authorized overtime to repair out-of-service (OOC)
chassis, and reposition these along with truck chassis closer to the Port of Los
Angeles. In September, OOC Chassis were at 4,593, which was down from 8,800 in
July 2020 (Angell, 2020). Until Rail chassis have been properly repaired, service or
massively produced, disruptions will continue to fall on the Alameda Corridor and
the Transfer Centers they feed into. The Trade corridor Enhancement Program
through the California Transportation Commission (CTC), will distribute $392.4
million USD to assist in rail programs to improve the East Basin Rail Gateway, and
Fenix Marine Intermodal Rail-Yard Expansion feeding of the Alameda Corridor
(Luczak, 2020).

51

Chapter 4.7 Transfer Centers and Warehousing Disruption
In research completed by Kang (2018), it was determined that the Port of Los
Angeles feeds into 5,364 Warehouses in the Southern California Area as of 2016
(Figure 19). The concerns and basis of this report, addresses how and why
warehousing locations have changed overtime and decentralized due to expansions
of residential areas and re-zoning, which increases time and distance travelled for
trucks and rail. It was also determined that the location of warehouses is dependent
on flexibility of stringent land use regulations, high land prices, and congestion.

Figure 19: Warehousing Locations in Southern California (Source: Kang, 2018)

Through several reports completed by Avison Young, Lee & Associates, and DAUM
Commercial, we analysed statistics for Los Angeles South Bay, Inland Empire East
and West, and Los Angeles North Industrial Complexes. Criteria used to evaluate
Warehousing Performance included Net Absorption, Net Deliveries, % Vacancy,
Cost Per Square Foot in USD, and % Vacancy Rate by US Market. We make the
following findings and concluded with the issues Warehousing faced during the
COVID-19 Pandemic, and how its Ripple Effect eventually reached Port Terminal
Performance at Port of Los Angeles.
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Figure 20: % Vacancy of Industrial Warehousing in Southern California (Source: Lee & Associates, 2021)

Overall Warehousing Vacancy sustained rapid declines during Q4 of 2020 due to
Holiday Seasonality. This was also due to surpluses of manufactured goods in stock
to avoid the 25% US-China Tariffs on goods. It’s noted that Pandemic induced ECommerce was on the rise, and was not just limited to goods, but many services such
as groceries and pharmaceuticals. This increased a demand for cold-storage facilities,
which to facilitate this surge would require conversion of warehousing (Avison
Young Research, 2020).

Figure 21: E-Commerce during COVID-19 (Source: US Census Bureau of Monthly Trade and Retail, 2021)
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At one point, according to the US Census Bureau of Monthly Trade and Retail
(2021), E-Commerce accounted for 15% overall total retail trade sales nationwide.
This included Motor Vehicles and Parts, Furniture, Building Materials, Electronics,
Clothing and General Merchandise (Figure 21). As for Non-Store Retailers, ECommerce was utilized 60 – 68% during the Pandemic.

Figure 22: Net Absorption of Industrial Warehousing (Source: Lee & Associates, 2021)

It is noted (Figure 22), that out of all the warehousing areas near Los Angeles, both
Inland Empire East (IEE) and West (IEW) account for > 70-75% of warehousing
storage and processing, with both facilities having the highest Net Absorption of
Cargo Volumes for both the Port of Los Angeles and Port of Long Beach. They also,
have the lowest vacancy of warehousing space, with IEE at 1.8% and IEW at 0.69%
reserve capacity for Q1 of 2021 (Figure 20). Project Statistics shared between
DAUM, Lee & Associates and Avison Young, suggest that warehousing
development is on the rise for IEE and IEW, but on the decline for LA South Bay
(LASB) and Los Angeles North (LAN). The reasoning for both declines, is due to
land availability and pricing per square foot. LAN, is the highest cost per square foot
for warehousing, due to its centralized location. It is also the most difficult to
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manage, due to inability to expand roads and rail. Its 2.8% vacancy rate is consistent
and unchanged from the previous year, due to low vacancy rates and positive
absorption, with low new inventory, makes it unfavourable for leasing. LASB, is the
cheapest per square foot, but vacancy is scarce within the vicinity of the Port of Los
Angeles and Long Beach, as this is prime space for container capacity,
accommodation for rail and truck chassis, as well as expansions of on-dock rail, and
rail that feeds into intermodal transfer yards.

Figure 23: Inland Empire - West, CA Industrial Warehousing (Source: Lee & Associates, 2021)

Figure 24: LA South Bay / Port Markets, CA Industrial Warehousing (Source: Lee & Associates, 2021)
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Figure 25: Los Angeles Cost of Indust. Warehousing Per Square Foot (Source: Lee & Associates, 2021)

Figure 26: Industrial Real Estate Vacancy Rate by Market 2020 (Source: Avison Young, 2021)
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CHAPTER 5 – Implementing Resilient Futures
After gathering extensive data analysing the entire Supply Chain that feeds the Port
of Los Angeles, we quantified it into many graphs and charts, and compared each
data set against one another. We determined significant disruptions not only from
within the Terminals, but all aspects of the chain were in catastrophic despair. But to
truly understand the data we obtaining digitally, we must extend to sociological
methods of questioning, reasoning, debating and articulating the facts and figures to
present day reality. After interviews from two senior members of Port Terminal
Operations in the United States, and a key Marine Economist with expertise in data
driven figures, we identified the key issues and needed to draft a solution.
Table 4

(Source: Author, 2021)

In Table 4, we referenced several decision-making processes, and determined that
the Analytic Hierarchical Process, is the best way to engage senior leadership in the
Port Management Sector of US Commerce. Through the process, like Chaos, we can
pinpoint each segment of Port Terminals, and what criteria falls between each
hierarchy which are subjected to disruptions. The AHP Port Terminal Performance
Questionnaire was made available early September of 2021, and was utilized for
two-weeks and sent to 50 surveyors, ranging in all aspects and skill-sets required for
the full functionality of Port and Supply Chain Operations. 30 Questions were
utilized, and optional comment sections were available to fully capture the surveyors
reasoning and analytical understanding of problem solving for disruptions and chaos.
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Utilizing the Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) as a method for organizing and
analysing complex decisions, can help Port Executives, Governments, and
Stakeholders make strategic decisions which can seem unclear when all criteria
available can seem beneficial to growth and recovery of Port Systems. Through the
case study survey conducted through various Port Authorities, Terminals, and
components of Supply Chains, with their relation to the COVID-19 Pandemic, we
can determine a general consensus for the best choices to foster Port Terminal
Resilience. Another determining factor for criteria in AHP modelling, is dependent
on the strengths and weaknesses of the economy, whether referring to a developed
country(s) such as the United States, Europe or Asia, verse a developing country or
one with poor infrastructure. Certain criteria, such as cyber-security, which involves
internet of things, artificial intelligence, smart technologies, firewalls and dedicated
servers, incurs heavy upfront costs, and required regular maintenance for it to
maintain its ability to protect port systems. This alone, could be a deferring factor,
which may be replaced with other traditional methods of security, which may help
certain Port Terminals over others.
With strong constraints of time, COVID-19 protocols for the State of California and
the United States, as well as available personnel to take the AHP survey at the Port
of Los Angeles, the survey was extended to all major Port Authorities and Supply
Chain Operators on the East and West Coasts of the United States. In doing so,
allows us to fully understand the psychological aspect of how each individual
surveyor reacted to multiple simultaneous disruptions within their linkage of the
global supply chain to the United States. Furthermore, the survey data, paired with
Port Performance data observed at the Port of Los Angeles, can encapsulate a
collaborative strategy, as to the choices Port Authorities must make to better manage
disruptions, including recently with COVID-19.
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Chapter 5.1 Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) Introduction
The Analytical Hierarchical Process, or better known as AHP, is a multi-criteria
decision-making technique, that helps people organize and analyse complex
decisions. It was developed by Thomas Saaty in 1980, in order to address
government agencies, businesses, healthcare and education processes for essential
decisions for the national economy of the United States. One of the greatest
challenges today that organizations face, is the ability to choose the most correct and
consistent alternatives in a way that maintains the systems strategic framework,
which in this case the goal in preserving Port Terminal Resilience (Triantaphyllou,
2002). The concept of a AHP structure, is to make pair-wise comparisons of criteria,
in which we describe in the follow-on sub-chapters.

Figure 27: AHP Basic Structure with Two Levels (Source: Teknomo, 2006)

The importance of each data pair, is to establish which one takes precedence over the
other through weighted averages. Following Shan, Zhou, Thai, Wong and Yuen
(2017) port-centric supply chain disruption threat study, we utilize four distinct
pillars of Infrastructure, Planning, Port Labor and Security. With comparing these
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four distinct sets against each other in a Criteria Comparison Matrix (CCM), and
determine their weighted averages through a Normalized Criteria Comparison Matrix
(NCCM), we process the four additional sub-categories, which emphasis attributes to
each foundational pillar. These additional pairs, will be crossed examined in their
own Criteria Comparison Matrix’s, like the previous sets, to determine weighted
averages. These new averages will determine which subsets will provide the best
alternative outcomes, or final choices that the Port Authority, Marine Terminal
Operator, or the State Government can utilize for their resilience framework, as
defined in Chapter 3. Before making final decisions within the AHP Process, we
will conduct a Consistency Check, which will verify that the choices made are
closely related to the transitive choice, which is the logic of preference. For example,
If Infrastructure (I) is preferred over Planning (P), we would write this as I > P.
Following on with the comparisons, Planning (P) would be compared to Port Labor
(PL) which can be written as P > PL. Since I > P, and P > PL, we can assume that I >
PL, which establishes that the dataset is consistent. If the answer chosen, is I < PL,
this demonstrates inconsistency, which will be elaborated further on in the subchapters. Once the Consistency Index is established, we compare it with the original
CCM to solve for the Consistency Ratio (CR), which will verify that all criteria
chosen through the evaluation is consistent.
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Chapter 5.1.1 AHP: Model Sequence

Figure 28: AHP Steps (Source: Liu et. al, 2013)

Figure 28, describes the step-by-step process for completing the AHP Model.
First, we establish an overall goal with criteria, and alternatives as the final decisions
and model these into a multi-tiered hierarchical structure. We evaluate these
elements by pair-wise comparisons of each criteria level to obtain weights of
elements. These weights will dictate which choices are more significant, and
eliminating choices which are insignificant. After calculating weights for all
elements through normalizing our preliminary Criteria Comparison Matrix, we
conduct a consistency check. If all tiers of our Port Terminal Resilience structures do
not demonstrate complete consistency (Value < 0.1), then we must re-evaluate the
criteria choices and their weights again to complete the consistency check. Following
this, we will rank and select the best alternatives.
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Chapter 5.1.2 AHP: Model Structure
To answering the question “How can Ports implement changes in order to build and
restructure its resilience?” we develop our AHP Model (Figure 29) with the four
pillars from Shan et. al (2017), which include Infrastructure, Planning, Port Labor
and Security and their sub criteria, which are important elements within Port
Terminal Planning and Performance.

Figure 29: AHP Model for Port Terminal Resilience (Source: Loh et. al, 2017; Author, 2021)

Underneath the Infrastructure Criteria, we established Container Capacity, Capital
Equipment, Roads & Rail, and Warehousing. All of these are essential physical
systems and structures of a Port Terminal.
With Planning, we decided to utilized Short-Term & Long-Term Goals,
Communications, Observation and Coordination. This focuses on the sociological
aspects that drive human interaction through verbal, visual and cognitive activity.
Port Labor focuses on the essential workers who operate heavy machinery, capital
equipment, gang teams, and work at Intermodal Cross Deck Facilities and
Warehousing. These specifically include Longshoremen (Dockers), Warehousemen,
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Crane Operators, Top Handler Drivers, Side Pick Drivers, Craftsman, and Draymen
(Truck Drivers). Though sociological aspects are similar to pillars within the
Planning Criteria, these focus on job-oriented, highly specialized physical
components that drive the movement and work of the Labor Force and Operations
within Terminals and Facilities. These include the Labor Agreements, Flexible
Workforce Roles and Operating Hours that occurs through contract agreements and
arbitrations with the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) and the International
Longshoremen and Warehouse Union (ILWU), which are specific to the case study.
On the East Coast of the United States however, are different Union Labor Pools
such as the International Longshoremen Association (ILA), International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron
Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers. These are important, due to
established work, rest, pay and vacation rules, which are agreed upon.
Finally, Security Criteria focuses on the physical and digital aspects of protecting
Port Terminals. Cyber Security includes port terminal programs and software for
Finance, Automation (Gates, Vehicles, Capital Equipment), Firewall Protection
(against phishing, malware, extortion, hacktivism, ransomware) (Senarak, 2020), and
IT Services. Inspections within Security criteria involve human health assessments
and analysing declaration of cargos for contraband and dangerous substances and
goods, which could impact the local and national economy at the port of entry to the
country. Physical Security involves the structural integrity of barriers, gates, ease of
access and contingencies taken when threats are elevates from minimal to severe at
Port Authorities, Terminals and adjacent facilities. Finally, Drills and Training
focuses on social interaction and communications between government agencies to
be proactive and reactive to threats that could impact the port and local economy.
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Chapter 5.1.3 AHP: Criteria Matrix and Pair-Wise Comparisons
After developing our base Criteria Comparison Matrix and developing our
Survey Questions (Annex L), we must evaluate each criteria’s levels of
importance through pairwise comparisons. This will determine their
precedence in order to obtain Criteria Weights.
Following the guidelines from Saaty (1980), Teknomo (2006), and (Table 5)
each pair is evaluated by their Intensity of Importance. For this survey, we
utilized scale numbers between 1 and 9, eliminated intermediate values
between two adjacent judgements. An entry of 1, would mean that both
categories being compared are equally important. Whereas a rating between 3
to 9 in either direction, would demonstrate elevating importance of the first
element over the second in the pair (i.e., A > B, or B > A).
Table 5

(Source: Saaty, 1980)

Upon completion of the Port Terminal Performance survey, each category of
criteria was examined to determine their intensity of importance, which can
be examined in the AHP Criteria Evaluation Table (Appendix, Table K.1).
In this table, we take all the results from pair-wise comparison questions, and
formulate separate columns with corresponding rows for each surveyor.
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Choices which strongly in favour Selection A, would have a positive integer,
while negatives represent Section B.

Figure 30: Pair-wise Element Table (Source: Bunruamkaew, 2012)

Table 6

(Source: Author, 2021)

Once these rows and columns are formed, we take the averages of each column, to
determine which will be the overall graded criteria to enter in our first Criteria
Comparison Matrix Table.

Chapter 5.1.4 AHP: Normalized Principal Eigen Vectors and Weights
After establishing our Criteria Comparison Matrix (CCM), the next step is to
compute our priority vectors by normalizing them, also known as normalized eigen
vectors. The term Eigen, is as a German term which means “belong to” or “unique
to” in relation to the original CCM Table created. The goal of these vectors, is to take
the data from the preliminary data set (Table 6), and transform these numbers into
more manageable sets, which will help us determine each criteria’s weight and
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precedence. For example, to calculate an Eigen Vector, we would utilize (Table 6) by
entering into Row 1 (A) Column 1 (B) and take the first value (X). After computing
the sum of each individual column, we would divide the first value against the sum
(X / X). In doing so, with each Row and Column, we develop our Normalized
Criteria Comparison Matrix (Table 7). At the bottom of the new table, and
computing the calculations correctly, the sum of all elements within these columns of
priority vectors equal to 1. After adding each individual rows entries across the
table, will determine the weighted value for that criterion.

Figure 31: Normalizing Pair-wise Element Table (Source: Bunruamkaew, 2012)

Table 7

(Source: Author, 2021)
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Chapter 5.1.5 AHP: Consistency Index
We can define Consistent as acting, completing or choosing decisions in the same
way over time (Oxford, 2021). This is critical when making decisions which could
impact a Shipping Company, a privately owned or inter-governmental agency Port
Terminal, or a Port Authority in contrast to connecting systems. These systems, are
the follow-on links to the Supply Chain (Forward and Reverse) as well as the overall
economy. When Thomas Saaty developed AHP, he realized that as humans, we are
susceptible to error, which is designated as inconsistencies. When we compare the
data sets through the Consistency Index (CI), we are evaluating that inconsistency
will not exceed 10%. However, if the ratio is more than 10%, we would need to go
back and improve the CR of pair-wise comparisons in order for it to be acceptable. If
the CI measure perfect zero, it means that the data set would be 100% accurate,
which is not scientifically accurate.

Chapter 5.1.5.1 AHP: Lambda (λ) and Lambda Max (λMAX)
In order to calculate consistency, we must calculate lambda (λ) and average the sums
to achieve lambda max (λmax). We do this by collecting data entries from the initial
CCM table, and compare the weighted averages from the NCCM table for each row
entry. Since we have four rows, we require four entries in order to achieve a proper
average to find lambda max (Figure 32, Table 8).
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Figure 32: Solving for Lambda Max (Source: Bunruamkaew, 2012)

Table 8

(Source: Author, 2021)
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After completing this process, we have obtained λmax for each criterion in
(Table 8).

Chapter 5.1.5.2 AHP: Lambda Max (λMAX) and Comparison Matrix (N)
After determining each categories of Lambda Max (λmax), we can complete a
Consistency Index, which is comparing λmax against the number of entries per
row. In this case, N = 4, as each criterion has four entries.

Chapter 5.1.6 AHP: Consistency Ratio
Following completing our Consistency Index (CI), we can complete the final part of
the AHP process and determine which factors can be utilized as our alternatives. In
order to complete this final step, we must refer to Saaty (1980) Random Index Table.
After calculating the Consistency Ratio (CR), we verifying that all five fields yield a
ratio of less than 10% Consistency Error (0.10). Once verified, we took the weighted
averages of all the main criteria and sub criteria, multiplied the sub-criteria to their
foundation criteria’s weight (Infrastructure, Planning, Port Labor and Security) in
order to determine best alternatives.
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Table 9

(Source: Saaty, 1980)

Table 10

(Source: Author, 2021)

Chapter 5.2 AHP: Findings and Decision Making
The Port Terminal Performance Survey, was disseminated to 50 various Maritime
Executive and professionals across the United States from September 3rd to
September 14th, which asked 30 questions relevant to the study of “How COVID-19
has impacted Port Terminal Performance in the United States”. Out of the initial 50,
25 were able to respond and provide essential feedback through individual remarks
to justify their selections. This section provides an overview and summary of key
analytical points of the survey and their remarks. As we determined through our
analysis of survey data, the best four alternatives in each separate criterion selected
for Port Terminal Resilience, were Capital Equipment (19.7%), Automation (11.3%),
Cyber-Security (7.2%) and Coordination (5.53%).
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Table 11

(Source: Author, 2021)

Figure 33: Finalized Model for Port Terminal Resilience (Source: Loh et. al, 2017; Author, 2021)

Other criteria that were deemed important but not critical, was Road & Rail (11.4%,
Infrastructure), Container Capacity (7.3%, Infrastructure), Physical Security (6.9%,
Security), and Communications (5.50%, Planning).
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We were able to determine many findings and cases with supporting evidence as to
why these four choices preceded slightly above high rated sub-criteria.
In the survey for Infrastructure, 16 of the 25 surveyors were involved as Terminal
Operators and Port Authorities, as acting or former Executive Directors, CEOs,
Senior Executive Staff as well as middle management for Port Terminals. The
remaining (9) held roles involved within the Supply Chain that feeds major ports on
both coasts of the United States. When asked what the most single important action
to improve Infrastructural Performance at Port Terminals was, 64% (16) defended
that Capital Equipment (Portainers, Front-End Loaders, Reach Stackers, RailMounted Gantry’s and Straddlers) was superior to Road & Rail Connectivity at 28%
(7).
In terms of Capital Equipment and Automation for developing Port Terminal
Resilience, this might predicate that Port stakeholders, if presented the opportunity,
would want to expand and grow their port facilities and terminals while increasing
available sub-services. These services, such as Cruise Terminals, can provide
additional supplementary revenue for the Port Authority as well as the local economy
(Santos et. al, 2019). In contrast, this would also force the improvements and
developments of new Roads and Rail to feed the terminals. All this considered,
would be included into required construction contracts, as state and federal
governments own major highways and roadways. In addition to the expansion of
Port Terminal footprints, would give opportunities to experiment in improved design,
operations, and changes to nautical profiles (Rodrigue & Notteboom, 2021).
Though Roads & Rail are essential in terms of connectivity for Ports, as a
demonstrated key disruptor for the Port of Los Angeles, it is difficult to develop new
or repair roads, that are not privately owned by the Terminal or the Port Authority, as
this is the responsibility of state and local governments (ARTBA, 2017). Also,
maintenance and installation of new rail is dependent on the rail company that owns
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it, such as the Alameda Corridor (AC), Union Pacific (UPR) and Burlington North
Santa Fe (BNSF) rail operating companies for the Ports of Los Angeles / Long Beach
(Heier, 2009).
With changes and adaptations of terminal growth, adding automated capital
equipment, would help to alleviate Labor force strains, reduce accidents, pollution,
and increase efficiency which would help with container throughput times (Dávid,
2019).
Automation however, has always been the source of controversy at the Ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach. According to Richardson (2021), Terminal Operators, who
lease space within the Ports of LA/LB, plan to automate more of the port facilities,
which do not coincide and agree with US Labor Unions (ILWU). On one hand,
threats of Automation for Union Members, means loss of job security, wages, as well
as reducing benefits of earnings for US and local economies, while maximizing
extraction of foreign profit. On the other hand, upgrades of automation are essential
for ports to remain efficient and competitive globally, especially for the Ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach (Pacific Maritime Association, 2020). In order to
harmonize the partnership between Union Workers and Automated Robotics for Port
Terminal Resilience Framework, negotiations between the Labor Force and the
employment association should come to a general agreement that laborers will not
only be guaranteed their jobs, but be further trained, specialized and certified to
manage this equipment. In doing so, will prevent repeated attempted from the Los
Angeles Board of Harbor Commissioners from issuing permits which block Terminal
Operators and the Employment Association, such as the attempts of automation of
Pier 400 of APM Terminals at the Port of Los Angeles.
With upgrades to Automation and all Port Terminal Systems, it is crucial that all
glitches are thoroughly worked out before completely integrating newer technologies
over older systems. The upgrades of NAVIS N4 Terminal Operating Systems (TOS)
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at Maher Terminals in the Port of NY-NJ in 2013, caused significant delays,
disruptions and ripple effects, which impacted drayage companies for losses to
chassis rentals, per diem charges of equipment, and loss of productivity. In addition,
the terminal was forced to waive free time and demurrage rates, as well as extend
gate times to account for lost Port Performance (Bonney, 2013). This unifies the
decisions within the AHP to choose Capital Equipment, Automation and
enhancements of Cyber Security.
Cyber Security Awareness (7.2%) as mentioned earlier, is the practice of defending
computer systems against malicious attacks and threats to supply chains. The
maritime industry has increasingly become more digitalized, with most maritime
operators adopting digital technologies to modify their business models, upgrade
operations efficiency to create overall value for their customers (Shepherd, 2004, as
cited in Senarak, 2020).
The link between systems for vessels at sea, and at shore-side facilities, are
extremely vulnerable to external disruptions with the expansions of newer
technology and software. However, one must understand that digitalization and
cyber-risks are two sides of the same coin (Mallick, 2017).
With recent attacks in the past 10 years in the Maritime Industry, survey participants
may have felt that with upgrading and expanding Port Capacity through Capital
Equipment and Automation, comes an increased inherent risk that hackers will
attempt to exploit and defeat Port Systems for monetary gain and spurring economic
chaos. This was verified not only through the AHP choices, but reiterated as a
question as to “what is the most single important action within Port Security to
improve Resilience”.
Most recently in the United States, a ransomware attack against Colonial Oil from
Russian hacker group DarkSide, forced the shutdown of a strategic pipeline which
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runs up the entire eastern seaboard, causing chaotic ripple effects of surging gas
prices, demand, and public fear, while facilities were challenged to ration the amount
of gas for consumers (Javers, 2021). Other attacks have occurred at the Port of San
Diego, causing $30 million in IT damages and $6 million lost in ransom
disbursements (Freeman, 2018), The NotPetya ransomware which attacked Maersk
Line, disrupting operations in 76 ports and accumulated a loss of $300 million in
2017 (Gold, 2021), and cyberattacks against the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) which occurred days after similar ones against shipping company CMA CGM
(Konrad, 2020).
In defence for the importance of Cyber Security, the Port of Los Angeles in
December of 2020 took initiatives to increase Cyber Security through a partnership
with big-tech computer company, IBM. At $6.8 million USD, and with a three-year
agreement between the seaport and the tech-business, the Port will design and
operate a Port Cyber Resilience Centre (CRC). As a Maritime Security Intelligence
and Operations Centre (SIOC), its objectives are to integrate complete supply chain
security and resiliency between the port, terminal operators, shippers, suppliers, rail
operators and telecommunications, analyse and predict threat activities. (Rundle,
2020). While allowing stakeholders control over their own information, the CRC will
act as a “system of systems”, which rapidly integrates and shares real-time data with
each other to better coordinate defensive responses as needed (Sanfield & Campbell,
2020). This should set the example of the future directions for better overall supply
chain security.
Coordination (5.5%) with all the previous best alternatives, was the final choice for
Port Terminal Resilience. Through the vast networks of port and supply chain
systems, their complexity and uncertainty for decision-making situations (e.g.
COVID-19 disruptions), despite high level forecasting, can be managed through two
basic categories by managing daily operational activities and improving processes.
According to Huiskonen and Pirttilä (2001) coordination between supply chains and
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overall logistics, is sharing a unified approach to tasks and objectives, unified
working practices, and integration into vertical processes. All components of the
system must fully integrate and have one generalized goal, and understand and
accept the tasks, requirements and purpose for this goal.
In the case for the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA (referred as the San
Pedro Bay Port Complex), both are separate municipal authorities, occupying the
same water space, fiercely competitive with one another, and utilize the same supply
chain structure of roads, highways, and rail. As researched by Knatz (2018), there
have been significant attempts to merge both ports, mostly from business groups,
elected official and port users who have no real-time visibility, knowledge of port
operations and limited stakeholder involvement; but these attempts have always been
rejected. Cooperative efforts however, had increased in the 1980’s to confront issues
with both Port administrations.
More recently, in terms to protect and respond against rising competition from JAX
Ports, Port of Savannah, and the Northwest Seaport Alliance of Port Seattle-Tacoma
(Maritime Executive, 2020), Port LA/LB announced an alliance. Through
coordination, the Port would work together to improve infrastructure, operational
efficiency, connectivity, workforce development, cyber-security and additional
metrics (Ports Strengthen Collaboration to Boost Competitiveness | Port of Los
Angeles, 2020). This has been agreed and expanded on through the Federal Maritime
Commission Agreement No. 201219 (Federal Maritime Commission, 2015;
Burnson, 2020). In periods of disruption, through such coordination to address
COVID-19, this is one direction that US Ports have pursued to control, and view the
supply chain as one single harmonious system.
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CHAPTER 6 – Summary and Conclusion
Resilience, has been a very powerful and important mechanism to give people the
strength to overcome hardships and become stronger than before. Through history,
World events such as wars, civil conflicts, coup d'état’s, natural disasters, periods of
economic decline and more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic, has taught us to
revisit the lesson of “What is Resilience?” The definition we establish today, could
very well mean something different tomorrow for the billions of other people we
trade and share our oceans with.
In determining a definition of Resilience for the study, we were able to thoroughly
analyse and examine a case-study of the United States largest seaport, the Port of Los
Angeles. Through this case-study, were able to identify periods of disruption, such as
the ILWU’s attempt to block a permit that would provide partial-automation for
APM Terminals in 2019, to the ongoing US-China Tariffs, their dreadful economic
impacts to the United States economy, and how it has impacted foreign relations,
suppliers and consumer demand.
We identified the pinpoints of supply chain bottlenecks through the study of COVID19 infection within Los Angeles County and how it impacted the Port of Los Angeles
Performance Measures. These measures included Truck Throughput Times,
Container Volumes, Rail Times, Dwell Times for Containers, Labor Force Hours,
Anchor Times and Berthing Times. In addition, we analysed data from Rail, Trade
and Warehousing in the Southern California area. To support the data, we also
completed a follow-on Port Terminal Performance Questionnaire, to further examine
the choices that Senior Executive Management staff would take, in order to improve
their Port Terminal Supply Chain Systems. Through a blend of Quantitative and
Qualitative methods, we were able to identify, critique and draw a conclusion with
the following key points.
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Port Authorities want to expand their footprints, the priority in being able to support
and host larger container vessels. These larger vessels guarantee growth through the
local and national economy, which will expand overall development and growth for
businesses. However, in expanding overall port capacity, requires the rest of the
foreland and hinterland services that feed into it to follow suite. Without dredging,
you cannot allow access for deeper draught vessels beyond the sea-buoy for most
ports, or have anchorages deep and safe enough to protect these vessels from storms.
Larger berths, with state-of-the-art capital equipment, automation, and a highly
skilled Labor force, will allow discharge and loading of containers at record
volumes, but is meaningless if the same cargo can’t efficiently be moved through the
terminals and recirculate in the remainder of the supply chain. Finally, you cannot
effectively move containers with damaged, dislocated or scarcity of both truck and
rail chassis.
The lesson to be learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic, is that entire Supply Chains
must be treated as one system, not individual parts, to overcome disruptions. Chaos
Theory thrives on the concept of pinpointing weaknesses in all components of nonlinear systems. Coordination and communication with all key stakeholders, must be
clear, concise and transparent, with unanimous understanding. Only then, will chaos
and disruptions be better managed. In addition, Ports and Supply Chains must
expand at the same scale together. More rail and roads to feed larger warehousing
(whether in footprint volume or physical number), in order to house the increased
cargo volumes from Intermodal Yards and Terminals, all delivered from the evergrowing container ship. Extension of Operating Hours per Shift for Truck-Drivers,
would also allow more time to return chassis to prove performance. There is also a
point to where Port Expansion is no longer possible due to the surrounding land, thus
reaching the inability to meet storage requirements, which was answered through the
questionnaire.
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In the Questionnaire, Capital Equipment, Automation, Cyber-Security and
Coordination, in that order, were identified as the most important factors for Port
Terminals Resiliency. All four concepts, also strongly integrate and correlate with
each other. When Port Expansion is no longer possible, a solution would be to
increase container throughput of the port by minimizing loading times and upgrading
Capital Equipment.
This Capital Equipment, can also be automated, and as a tool it needs to be
programmed precisely in order to coordinate work at its highest efficiency. Utilizing
partial-automation at terminals, while retaining a workforce specialized in operating
and maintaining this equipment, would satisfy the ILWU, as well as relations
between the operators and the PMA. Phases of Automation could temporarily be
increased or scaled back, depending on the levels of demand or disruptions from
within the Terminals, in order to correct throughput times and maximize efficiency.
Automation for the future could be extended to Rail Operations, and Warehousing
Efficiency, to allow around the clock operations.
With Automation, also comes the need to protection against rising cyber-threats
through security measures. Port Directors greatest concerns for the future of port
automation, are these cyber-threats, which have demonstrated repetitively the
substantial vulnerabilities within critical business systems which feed global
commerce. Without proper protection, the failure of these systems has catastrophic
consequences, costing millions for damage recovery, repairs, and induce market
bullwhip effects to economies, which last several weeks to months.
Some Ports, have taken appropriate steps to develop state-of-the-art security systems,
as a solution. The Port of Los Angeles partnered with IBM, to develop their Cyber
Resilience Center. The CRC, acts as an insurance policy and $6 million USD longterm investment. This demonstrates to operating companies and stakeholders, that
their interests will be protected and safeguarded to the best of the Ports ability. In
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return, this extended sense of security and trust, will allow stakeholders to invest
more time, money, and capital while reciprocating their mutual respect to the Port
Authorities leadership.
Finally, Coordination brings all the elements of this study together, and is necessary
in order to collaborate many goals at various levels, whether strategic planning by
essential stakeholders, or routine operations at different managerial levels.
Through identifying several issues through the study and questionnaire, the best
recommendation and solution for the Port of Los Angeles, would be to update their
current Port Master Plan (2018) with lessons learned from 2019 to April 2021.
Key areas of improvement for the Port Master Plan, are Section’s 3.0 (Development
Goals), 4.0 (Factors Affecting Demand for Port Development), 5.4 – 5.6 (Proposed
Projects for Container Terminal Expansions), 5.7 (Dredging), with strong emphasis
on 7.2.2. (Expansions of Rail).
In identifying the choke-points from inside all six container terminals, rail, truck,
intermodal yards and warehousing, a COVID-19 Performance Analysis should be
drafted, collaborated, (similar to the language of “By the Numbers” tariff report) and
presented from the Executive Director to the Los Angeles Board of Harbor
Commissioners. In this report, can identify and present performance data not covered
in this study and protected from the Freedom of Information Act.
With these issues addressed to the Board of Commissioners, the Port Master Plan can
be updated, sanitized, and elevated further up to the Mayor’s Office, Los Angeles
City Council and eventually addressed to the State Legislatures of the General
Assembly and the Senate of California. Only then, can the issues from the state
legislatures for expansion of warehousing leasing and land, development of roads
and rail, be properly addressed and prepared to be presented to the Governor of
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California, and further addressed to the US Department of Transportation. With
coordination of all these political policies and plans to address the supply chain
issues, will provide the necessary friction to move forward, redevelop the Port of Los
Angeles better, and help to regain lost market share of foreign imports from the East
Coast of the United States. All these implemented actions and strategies, would
ensure the Port of Los Angeles to continue delivering its promise and slogan as
“America’s Port”.
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Appendix A. China and West Coast US Trade Index’s (Graphs)
Graph A.1 (SCFI Shanghai – WC America Freight Rate)
Source: Clarkson’s Research

Graph A.2 (CCFI China – WC America Freight Rate)
Source: Clarkson’s Research
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Graph A.3 (China Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index)
Source: Clarkson’s Research
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Appendix B. Port of Los Angeles Statistics - Number of Ships at Anchor, Berth,
Departed (Graphs)
Graph B.1 (Port of Los Angeles Anchor and Berthing Statistics 2019)
Source: Port of Los Angeles Harbourmaster Office
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Graph B.2 (Port of Los Angeles Anchor and Berthing Statistics 2020)
Source: Port of Los Angeles Harbourmaster Office
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Graph B.3 (Port of Los Angeles Anchor and Berthing Statistics 2021)
Source: Port of Los Angeles Harbourmaster Office
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Appendix C. Port of Los Angeles Statistics - Days at Berth, Days at Anchor (Graphs)
Graph C.1 (Port of Los Angeles Average Days at Anchor and Berth 2019)
Source: Port of Los Angeles Harbourmaster Office
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Graph C.2 (Port of Los Angeles Average Days at Anchor and Berth 2020)
Source: Port of Los Angeles Harbourmaster Office
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Graph C.3 (Port of Los Angeles Average Days at Anchor and Berth 2021)
Source: Port of Los Angeles Harbourmaster Office

119

Appendix D. COVID-19 Infection Statistics (Graph)
Graph D.1 (COVID-19 Infection Rates of Trading Partners and Los Angeles County 2020 - 2021)
Source: Our World in Data (https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus)
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Appendix E. Shipping Liner Throughput at Port of Los Angeles (Graph)
Graph E.1 (TOP 10 Shipping Liners in the Port of Los Angeles 2019 – 2021)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph E.2 (Port of Los Angeles Total Twenty Equivalent Unit Volume (2019-2021))
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Appendix F. Truck Turn-Times and Gate Transactions (Graphs and Tables)
Graph F.1 (Port of Los Angeles Truck Turn-Times and Gate Transactions 2019 – 2021)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph F.2 (APM Terminals Truck Turn-Times and Gate Transactions 2019 – 2021)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph F.3 (WBCT Truck Turn-Times and Gate Transactions 2019 – 2021)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph F.4 (Fenix Marine Services Truck Turn-Times and Gate Transactions 2019 – 2021)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph F.5 (TraPac Terminal Truck Turn-Times and Gate Transactions 2019 – 2021)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph F.6 (Yusen Terminals Truck Turn-Times and Gate Transactions 2019 – 2021)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph F.7 (Everport Terminals Truck Turn-Times and Gate Transactions 2019 – 2021)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph F.8 & F9 (Port Terminals of Los Angeles – Average Truck Turn Times (Shift 1 & 2)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph F.10 (Street Dwell Times of Truck Containers and Chassis)
Source: Pool of Pools Official* (http://www.pop-lalb.com/reports/Net_Imbalance.pdf)
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Table F.1 & F.2 (Port of Los Angeles Terminal Times and Gate Transactions (Shift 1)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Table F.3 & F.4 (Port of Los Angeles Truck Turn-Times and Queue Times (Shift 1)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Table F.5 & F.6 (Port of Los Angeles Terminal Times and Gate Transactions (Shift 2)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Table F.7 & F.8 (Port of Los Angeles Truck Turn-Times and Queue Times (Shift 2)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Table F.9 (Port of Los Angeles Days After Discharge Containers (LOCAL)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Table F.10 (Port of Los Angeles Days After Discharge Containers (RAIL)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Table F.11 (Port of Los Angeles Days After Discharge Containers (TOTAL)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Table F.12 (Pool of Pools Chassis Statistics)
Source: Pool of Pools Official* (http://www.pop-lalb.com/reports/Net_Imbalance.pdf)
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Table F.13 (Pool of Pools Chassis Out of Service Chassis)
Source: Pool of Pools Official* (http://www.pop-lalb.com/reports/OOS.pdf)
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Appendix G. Port Terminal Disruptions (Graph)
Graph G.1 (Comparison of TEU Levels and ILWU Hours at San Pedro Bay Ports (Port of Los
Angeles and Port of Long Beach)
Source: Pacific Maritime Association (https://www.pmanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/John_Martin_Research-July_2021.pdf)
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Graph G.2 San Pedro Bay Port Terminal Dwell Time / Terminal Congestion (During COVID-19
Pandemic)
Source: Pacific Maritime Association (https://www.pmanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/John_Martin_Research-July_2021.pdf)

142

Graph G.3 Daily Share of Container Ships at Berth Not Using Labor (Port of Los Angeles-Long
Beach)
Source: Pacific Maritime Association (https://www.pmanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/John_Martin_Research-July_2021.pdf)
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Graph G.4 Automated Terminal vs. Traditional Terminal Performance (During COVID-19 Pandemic)
Source: Pacific Maritime Association (https://www.pmanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/John_Martin_Research-July_2021.pdf)
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Appendix H. Rail, On-Street Dwell Times (Graph)
Graph H.1 Days after Discharge (Containers) for Port of Los Angeles (TOTAL)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph H.2 Days after Discharge (Containers) for Port of Los Angeles (LOCAL)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph H.3 Days after Discharge (Containers) for Port of Los Angeles (RAIL)
Source: Wabtec Port Optimizer (https://tower.portoptimizer.com/)
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Graph H.4, H.5 and H.6
Rail Dwell Time in Days (Port of Los Angeles and Port of Long Beach)
Dwell Times in Day % > 5 Days
Source: PMSA (https://www.pmsaship.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/West-Coast-Trade-ReportMay-2021.pdf)
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Graph H.6 Alameda Corridor (Historic Data – Average Number of Trains Per Day)
Source: Alameda Corridor Transit Authority (https://1popqd1sgf8034z1s33q7dj6-wpengine.netdnassl.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CorridorTrainCounts.pdf)
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Appendix I. Warehousing Statistics (Graph)
Graph I.1 & I.2
Net Absorption of Industrial Warehousing in Southern California (2019 - 2021)
% Vacancy of Industrial Warehousing in Southern California (2019 – 2021)
Source: https://www.lee-associates.com/research/page/3/?research-property-type=-1&researchlocation=3838&research-year=-1
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Graph I.3 & I.4
Los Angeles Cost of Industrial Warehousing Per Square Foot (During COVID-19 Pandemic)
Los Angeles South Bay – Pork Markets, CA (Industrial Warehousing Overview)
Source: https://www.lee-associates.com/research/page/3/?research-property-type=-1&researchlocation=3838&research-year=-1
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Graph I.5 & I.6
Inland Empire - West, CA (Industrial Warehousing Overview)
Inland Empire – East, CA (Industrial Warehousing Overview)
Source: https://www.lee-associates.com/research/page/3/?research-property-type=-1&researchlocation=3838&research-year=-1
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Graph I.7 & I.8
Los Angeles North, CA (Industrial Warehousing Overview)
Industrial Real Estate Vacancy Rate by Market 2020 (Year Average)
Source: (https://www.lee-associates.com/research/page/3/?research-property-type=-1&researchlocation=3838&research-year=-1) (https://avison-young.foleon.com/2021-forecast/us-real-estatetrends/industrial/)
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Appendix J. E-Commerce and Trade Statistics (Graph)
Graph J.1 & J.2
Changes in Demand for E-Commerce (2018 to COVID-19 Pandemic)
Online Store Demand for E-Commerce (2018 to COVID-19 Pandemic)
Source: (https://www.census.gov/retail/index.html#ecommerce)
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Appendix K. Analytic Hierarchical Process Data (Tables)
Table K.1 AHP Criteria Evaluation Table
Source: Author
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Table K.2 AHP Criteria Comparison Matrix (All Sets for Step 1)
Source: Author
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Table K.3 AHP Criteria Comparison Matrix (All Sets for Step 2)
Source: Author
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Table K.4 AHP Criteria Comparison Matrix (All Sets for Step 3)
Source: Author
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Appendix L. Port Terminal Performance AHP Survey
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